The missed approaches don't 'separate' , but do at least segregate the traffic. They were changed after a 1997 airprox very similar to the incident in the programme.
TCAS may have been omitted from the programme, but it's not failsafe , two recent incidents have taught us that. I would imagine it's much more difficult to fly an RA at 1800' than level 350 .
Maybe the programme makers were right to leave it out than confuse the issue by including it then discussing it's drawbacks.
People here seem much keener on picking up continuity errors such as northbound bilbao flights and wrong frequencies than the larger issues explored.
What about corporate versus personal culpability ?
Should you work beyond the end of your shift ?
What happens to the 40 aircraft holding for Heathrow if we lose both runways ?
Can anyone tell me how the go-around alarm would have helped in the incident detailed last night ? What could Northolt, Thames or Fin have done when tower had both aircraft ?