AR, if we consider your views without judgement, this might help us to identify alternatives to the idealist situation described.
We are experts in what crews ‘should’ have done after the fact, and how to use this distorted knowledge for futuristic solutions. Alternatively we might consider what the crew ‘could’ have done in the particular circumstances, what were they actually capable of, and thus what insight this gives us.
The mantra of “use everything - all available resources”, is continually repeated, more often without thought as to what is meant. Is it possible to use everything, what is ‘everything’, does it vary with situation, training, experience?
Does the industry teach what aspects are required in each situation, how to identify what information to use (data with understanding), vice those cues we might feel comfortable with. Is all information the same, what is important and why, how are these aspects referenced, prioritised, rated, individually and particularly collectively?
How might we know if pilots do not recognise appropriate factors? There may have been many successes in training and previous operations, but encountering an unusual situation then the application of previous skills could fall short of the performance required for any number of human factors reasons.
How do pilots acquire that ‘understanding’ which is so easy to identify with hindsight; yet the industry continues to churn out mantras full of assumption, and perhaps without the necessary thought and explanation to ensure understanding.
We cannot use ‘all of the information all of the time’ (a limit of human performance); but we might use an adaption of the rest of Abraham Lincoln’s quote; perhaps there is something to be learnt from that.
The industry appears to be blinded by hindsight, attempting to find patterns and trying to resolve past problems with the same fixes, resulting in few real gains in improving safety – how can we move forward by looking backwards.