Just documenting latitudes and distances for two key flight paths from the fan I generated last month in replicating & validating the ATSB’s original endurance line (SE border of S1/S2/S3, Fig.3, p.5, June 26 ATSB report):
(wide map:
http://bit.ly/WIb2Ng close-up of search zone:
http://bit.ly/1nI3V0Q)
Start point (NW tip of Sumatra):
18:36:03 5°59′ N
A
460 knot path would hit Inmarsat arcs 2-thru-6 at these SOUTH latitudes:
19:41:03 2°14′
20:41:05 9°50′
21:41:27 17°32′
22:41:22 25°11′
0:11:00 36°35′
…and end in the middle of the
March 17-27 search zone
…with (according to the width of S2 at that point and heading) 329 nmi to spare
…for a total flight distance of 5.58hrs x 460 kts = 2,568 + 330 = 2,897 nmi
if new fuel analysis shortens range 11% = 319 nmi:
…
still feasible (by March ATSB standards), with 10 nmi to spare
A
390 knot path would hit Inmarsat arcs 2-thru-6 at these SOUTH latitudes:
19:41:03 0°59′
20:41:05 7°30′
21:41:27 14°3′
22:41:22 20°27′
0:11:00 29°48′
…and end in the middle of the
Mar.28-Apr.1 search zone
…with (according to the width of S3 at that point and heading) 248 nmi to spare
…for a total flight distance of 5.58hrs x 390 kts = 2,177 + 248 = 2,425 nmi
if new fuel analysis shortens range 11% = 267 nmi:
…
NOT feasible (by March ATSB standards) by 19 nmi
If you drop fuel by less: original search location still feasible
If you drop fuel by more: new search location still infeasible
This simple, transparent demonstration proves mathematically – without a single parameter that does not come from the ATSB’s own reports – that their “drop in starting fuel” argument could not POSSIBLY have been a good reason to move the search 1,100km NE on March 28.
So why did they?