Originally Posted by Brigadier (Retd) BAH Parritt CBE
CONCLUSION
Operation Corporate was a great success. The Royal Navy, in a remarkably short period, gathered a task force together, and sailed 8000 miles to the Falkland Islands. A large number of Merchant Navy ships were taken up from trade. From 2 April to 14 June 1982 the RN provided protection and supplies in the face of fierce opposition; the Royal Marines and Army fought a superior number of enemy and successfully liberated the Islands; the RAF provided essential air cover (sic) and resupplied those ashore as best they could, given the distances, with skill and bravery. The award of the South Atlantic Medal to those engaged in the period of hostilities with the medal and rosette was fully justified.
The issue lies in the selection of the date of 12th July as the cut off period for the award of the medal without the rosette. This decision, within days of the ending of hostilities, was remarkably rapid, and is considered by many observers to have been premature. Although the Argentine forces on the Falkland Islands had surrendered, it is clear that the British Government consistently feared, with good reason, for a significant further period, that there might be a resumption of hostilities. In particular they were nervous that the Argentine Government, notably the Argentine Air Force, which had operated to deadly effect during the war, might initiate some form of “revenge attack”. It was this assessment of the risk that resulted in the three services having to remain at very high states of alert, in extremely rigorous conditions, to maintain a credible defence of the Islands. Although there were in the event no fresh attacks, this may well have been at least in part because of the deterrent effect of British forces maintaining their ability to respond to any threat more or less immediately
In Sir John Holmes’ original review, he identifies one factor which can justify a change in earlier decisions regarding medallic recognition as “Significant new information becoming available that had not been considered previously”. In this case, the very early choice of the cut-off date of 12th July, which may have been at least partly driven by a perceived need, for political reasons, to ensure visible early rewards for the military success, in time for a planned parade in the early autumn, did not reflect or recognise the high degree of risk, as confirmed in repeated Cabinet Office Papers, which continued to exist in the period immediately after the ceasefire. Recognition of and compliance with this risk caused all those still involved in the Falklands Campaign to endure exceptional levels of rigour for several more months.
RECOMMENDATION
In these circumstances I believe that it is justified to extend the current period for qualification of the South Atlantic Medal without the Rosette, on the same conditions as before, to the 21st October 1982. That is the date when the requirement for ships to maintain ‘Defence Watch’ status was removed, because the airfield at Stanley was complete and operational, and the threat from Argentine forces was considered to have reduced sufficiently to justify such a step.
The number of personnel who would benefit from this decision is hard to calculate exactly but is likely to be around 10,000. The cost should be limited, even if new medals have to be struck, which is not certain, given the numbers originally produced. Research to establish eligibility should be relatively straightforward since the events are relatively recent and good records are readily available.