'Pilot and apprentice',
Your example of the S76 ALT hold might not have been the best one to introduce into this thread; the control of speed in a three axis ALT mode resides with the use of the collective, not by flying through and overriding the function of the AP - which I'm sure you know!
One of the functions of the HFDM system is to monitor the observance of aircraft limitations; if the practice of using the ALT mode with excessive power is leading to exceedance of the limitations, it is the responsibility of the HFDM manager to raise it with the crew members (how this is done is one of the aspects of the company culture). If it is subsequently decided that this is a trend, it is up to operators to ensure that this trend is addressed by: bringing it to the attention of all; increasing the coverage of autopilots in training; and, auditing the system to ensure that the actions have had the required effect.
Your point in favour of increased professionalism has already had the support of everyone (who would have argued against it?); the question is - how is that achieved? HC and I have constantly bemoaned the lack of crew-room discussion in which the matters we are considering here would have been the subject of heated debate. I think that HC might be correct that the change in work patterns have resulted in the demise of this valuable forum (it certainly was part of my education when I first operated on the North Sea). In some sense it has been reproduced in boards such as PPRune - but with far less restraint because of the remoteness of the medium.
During the preceding pages has been argued the necessity for training based upon competence (not tick-box items and hours allocation) and the facilitation of 'resilience' by exposure to normal scenarios with seeded occurrences. Evidence Based Training (EBT) makes these changes but we must not forget that EBT consists of three phases: the evaluation phase; the manoeuvres phase; and the scenario-based training phase. The assessment phase takes note of the competence of the pilots; in particular the demonstration of knowledge, skills and attitude. I think that 'pilot and apprentice' has already mentioned that in Canada, pilots who are assessed as not 'suited' for this type of operation are offered other opportunities (that certainly happened in Bristow Aberdeen in the early days).
The changing of the culture offshore will take some time to achieve but change it must. Whilst it would be nice for this to be achieved with all pilots remaining in their comfort zone, that will not be the case. Yes, we must ensure that the basic flying skills are not eroded by ensuring that the SOPs permit flight to be undertaken without AP assistance in the appropriate weather conditions (as was shown in the Shell Brunei presentation). Whilst making these changes, it must be made clear that there is a substantial difference between 'flying the aircraft' and 'managing the flight' as quoted earlier:
Necessary changes required in piloting skills when converting from flying with basic instruments and stabilisation, to managing the on-board systems, have not been fully recognised and implemented; there was ample evidence that the necessity for managed transition had not been understood (by regulators or operators) or put in place.
Hopefully, this first revolution will have been achieved before the advent of fly-by-wire.
Jim
PS Whilst we are all motivated to ensure that HC stays involved; it should be at the system level and not at the coal face. We should be mindful of Confucius and fish.