The Forsyth report suggested criteria for the DAS position recommended:
7. The next Director of Aviation Safety has leadership and management experience and capabilities in cultural change of large organisations. Aviation or other safety industry experience is highly desirable.
And in the Executive Summary this criteria was expanded...
"...The Panel concludes that CASA and industry need to build an effective collaborative relationship on a foundation of mutual trust and respect. Therefore, CASA needs to set a new strategic direction. The selection of a new Director of Aviation Safety should concentrate on finding an individual with leadership and change management abilities, rather than primarily aviation expertise. Other jurisdictions have appointed leaders without an aviation background, who have been successful in changing the strategic direction of the safety regulator..."
CM would have no problem with the latter part of the criteria but the 1st part could prove a major stumbling block. Discounting the Irish Bomber's bizarre attempts to bankrupt the company (& not being a Sky God myself so not really in the know), but I can't remember the last time that the Red Rat had a major cultural change within...?? Therefore maybe this isn't so much a sales pitch from CM but a case of sour grapes, either way it is certainly passing strange??
Also passing strange (& almost before the ink had dried on the CM diatribe), there was this follow up article from the Oz...
Dick Smith joins air traffic control safety row
THE former head of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority, Dick Smith, has warned the Defence Minister that he could be responsible for the nation’s first jet airline crash because of the shortcomings of military air traffic controllers.
In an extraordinary letter to David Johnston, Mr Smith warns that tough decisions are needed now because it was clear that safety levels for passenger planes at the military controlled airports of Darwin, Newcastle and Townsville were inadequate.
“Minister this is a shocker!” Mr Smith writes in a letter obtained by
The Weekend Australian. “I am sure you do not want to be responsible for the first jet airline fatalities in Australia’s history!
“After 30 years experience in our civil aviation history, my view is that the military simply do not have the efficiencies of scale to be able to adequately operate an acceptably safe air traffic system for civilian aircraft.”
News of Mr Smith’s letter, written last month, follows a call yesterday by former Qantas chief pilot Chris Manning for an urgent inquiry into safety at airports that are manned by military air traffic controllers.
Mr Manning, Qantas chief pilot from 2003 to 2008, is angry that the government has virtually ignored a damning Australian Transport Safety Bureau report from October last year, which found that air force controllers had a poorer safety record than their civilian counterparts. Because they are near air force bases, Darwin, Townsville and Newcastle airports are run
by military air traffic controllers despite the fact that the vast majority of planes — 94 per cent at Darwin and 88 per cent at Townsville — are civil aircraft.
Mr Smith, in a separate letter to Infrastructure Minister Warren Truss, says that travellers should be told of this fact before they fly into these airports.
The ATSB report found that between 2008 and 2012 military controllers controlled 25 per cent of air traffic but were involved in 36 per cent of loss of separation incidents — when planes pass too close to each other, increasing the risk of a mid-air collision.
Defence has defended its 250 controllers, insisting they have the same training as their civilian counterparts and that rigorous safety standards are applied to their operations. Defence disputes the findings of the ATSB report, saying that it “does not agree with an implication that the number of loss of separation per number of aircraft movements directly correlates to safety”.
“Military-controlled airspace is inherently different to civilian-controlled airspace — with high traffic peaks but low overall aircraft movement statistics, diverse aircraft types and constrained airspace — which makes the statistical comparison flawed,” a Defence spokesman said.
CASA has responded to the critical ATSB report by conducting a joint safety study of Newcastle airport, but it insists that it has a constructive relationship with Defence on safety issues.
Strange bed pals indeed..
Kharon:
I wonder why it took so long for the light to come on, it's not as though there hasn't been ample opportunity to 'stick an oar in' to date.
Ample opportunity indeed "K"...
And I'd suggest that there have been many less controversial but no less significant examples of Fort Fumble completely ignoring (proverbial middle finger..
), delaying, arguing the toss, on any bureau SSI/SR(s) addressed to the regulator in recent times. The classic example was the initially notified CSI associated with the Norfolk ditching report, that over 2 1/2 years was slowly whittled down to minor and is still outstanding in action response:
AO-2009-072-SI-01
On 25 June 2012, CASA advised that amendment 36 to International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Annex 6, State Letter AN 11/1.32-12/10 detailed a number of new Standards and Recommended Practices (SARP) in regard to fuel planning, in-flight fuel management, the selection of alternates and extended diversion time operations (EDTO). In this respect, CASA provided the following update:
- CASA intends to review Civil Aviation Advisory Publication (CAAP) 234-1 relating to fuel requirements. The ICAO fuel and alternate Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) are the basis of these changes and will be coordinated by CASA project OS09/13. While this project will focus specifically on passenger-carrying commercial flights the project will also be reviewing fuel requirements generally. The project will now be conducted in four phases. The first three phases will involve amendments to the relevant Civil Aviation Order (CAO) applicable Civil Aviation Advisory Publication (CAAP) 234-1 and Civil Aviation Regulation (CAR) 234. The project objectives are as follows:
- Phase 1 will involve amendments to the relevant CAOs and a review of CAAP 234-1 for flights to isolated aerodromes in light of the ICAO amendments. This phase will encompass fuel and operational requirements for flights to isolated aerodromes and will also consider the provision for flight to an alternate aerodrome from a destination that is a designated isolated aerodrome. The CAAP 234-1 will also be expanded to provide guidance and considerations necessary for flights to any isolated aerodrome, in particular when, and under what circumstances, a pilot should consider a diversion.
- Phase 2 will involve amendments to the relevant CAOs and further review of CAAP 234 in light of the ICAO amendments. This phase will encompass regulatory changes related to the implementation of general fuel planning, in-flight fuel management and the selection of alternate aerodromes. This review will include the methods by which pilots and operators calculate fuel required and fuel on-board.
- Phase 3 will involve amendment to CAR 234 to specify that the pilot in command, or the operator, must take reasonable steps to ensure sufficient fuel and oil shall be carried to undertake and continue the flight in safety. In addition, for flights conducted in accordance with Extended Diversion Time Operations (EDTO), CAO 82 and CAR 234 shall be amended to require consideration of a "critical fuel scenario" taking into account an aeroplane system failure or malfunction which could adversely affect safety of flight. It is anticipated that the methods chosen by the pilot-in-command and operator will therefore be sufficient to meet the requirements of CAR 234 to enable a flight to be undertaken and continue in safety.
- Phase 4 will involve the publication of internal and external educational material along with conducting briefings where necessary.
and that:
The amendment to the ICAO Annex 6 standards will be considered, and where appropriate, incorporated into the relevant legislation/advisory publication. In addition it is anticipated that there will be guidance material for operators who can demonstrate a particular level of performance-based compliance. The intent is to provide a bridge from the conventional approach to safety to the contemporary approach that uses process- based methods and Safety Risk Management (SRM) principles.
The ICAO Fuel and Flight Planning Manual are reflected in the SARP to Annex 6. Inclusion of the provisions of the Amendment 36 SARPs will be captured throughout this project. The ICAO SARP becomes effective from November 2012.
CASA will endeavour to make the changes as soon as possible - subject to third party arrangements such as drafting and resource availability. However the timing of the CAR changes will be subject to a timetable that is not necessarily able to be controlled by CASA.
This MSI is also directly relevant to the ATsB YMIA incident investigation
AO-2013-100, therefore giving CM the perfect excuse to weigh in on i.e. less controversial and far more relevant...
MTF...
