This crash fundamentally had sod-all to do with 'energy' or anything like that.
It was all about decisions. Decisions to do a third approach when the visibility was below minimums for that approach, and then continue that approach busting two sets of minimums.
FULL STOP.
Can't agree. Run the entire scenario again, same conditions, same pilot inputs, but this time the GA is initiated at 200`. Definitely recoverable?
I agree that busting limits is a no-no, but I would be mindful that other, less experienced aviators reading such emphatic thoughts might conclude that 200' is perfectly safe.
It provides for an acceptable level of safety, that's all. 300` is safer but unacceptable commercially. There's a trade off, of course.
What is clear is that any crew stepping out the box of standards, and there are many limits within this, increase significantly the likelihood of a bad outcome where there are other unforeseen system (organisational) failures.
To conclude that it was the crews actions alone sets us back 30 years and endorses poor crew training, poor operational control and supervision, inadequate state oversight and the need to apportion blame.