Originally Posted by
jcjeant
(you know the references they were already posted many time)
Actually I don't remember the specifics. Could you dig the references up for me?
What I'm pretty sure of is that this is the only commercial accident in the last 25 years involving loss of/faulty instrument indications where airspeed was the only thing lost. Others involved additional factors such as false overspeed warnings (and consequent AP pitch-up), or faulty altimeter readings.
So it's to know who is in charge of the regulation of air safety ... the aviation industry or the regulators ?
The regulators are *part of* the industry.
[EDIT : Winnerhofer:
First, I'd recommend that you don't post links directly to MS Office documents (such as PowerPoint files), as they have been known to contain malware - see if you can find a web-enabled link in future if you can.
I did upload it to my Google Drive and had a look, and as far as I can tell it's yet more SNPL nonsense. The author of the PowerPoint is basically arguing that the crew were handed what he calls "latent conditions" specifically by Airbus, AF and the French authorities. He links an unrelated 2002 piece in which the aircraft is expected to leave the flight envelope to the AF447 conditions in which it was not. It left the flight envelope because of the actions of the pilot flying.
He also infers that:
- The BEA should have investigated earlier incidents because the AF crew called a Mayday in one of them. As far as I'm aware a Mayday call does not automatically trigger an investigation by any investigation agency I know of.
- The BFU and NTSB recommendations applied to the Thales AA pitot probes alone, when they did not.
- The ETSO C16 standard was expected to be replaced with one which included mixed conditions and ice crystals, which it was not (see my post #232)