There is no objective standard and no 2 FSTDs of the same aircraft type would necessarily 'feel' the same.
If they use the same data, including specific data points, there may be some areas where a really astute pilot might notice some differences, no doubt. Also, one might expect to “feel” some differences with traditional hydraulic vs. newer electric motion systems. Additionally, I’ve flown airplanes of the same make/model/series and have found tremendous variations in feel and in performance. As I said, in one case all of us pilots referred to the fleet of airplanes as “Ed and Eli’s Used Airplane Lot.”
It's 3 years already since that FAA response and none of the major regulatory authorities are anywhere nearer adoption. The new technologies they were looking at are probably obsolete already!!
…and, as Mr. Babbitt said, the US Congress was running around (pants and hair on fire!) attempting to get ahead of the Colgan accident-generated family/news media hype about what rules were “in need” of change. One major FAA regulatory “over-haul” was almost completely gutted, and that effort’s basis and history was usurped to address the more panic-driven efforts. Of course, Mr. Babbitt could not say what was happening in those terms (I believe, because he was unaware) – but, as everyone surely recognizes, the FAA is a politically driven government agency – just as vulnerable to political and public pressures as any government organization … particularly when they’re standing at the edge of a gaping hole. So the rule that was likely to have incorporated a major portion of the ICAO details was sidetracked (very probably to die a death of inattention) and the focus and attention was given over to getting out a rule that was to address what the Congress was demanding be addressed.
What is unfortunate and will probably not be recognized, is what I indicated in my earlier post … and that is that small group of FAA safety employees (and I use that descriptor only because that is their FAA organization, NOT their personal or professional goal) that have historically allowed individual airlines the authority to deviate from published rules (without having the public and other airlines review and then concur or object to what was being granted) and granting the authority to complete the training and conduct the check, even for the issuance of a type rating or issuance of a certificate in a non-motion, Level 5 or 6 Flight Training Device (which as you know, is substantially less technically capable than a Level C or Level D simulator!) continues to offer essentially the same program - and some continue to believe that program will continue to compromise the production of competent, well trained aviators.
As you likely are aware, the ICAO document requires motion on the highest 2 levels of device (Type 6 and Type 7) – and the final training and all testing would be required in one of those 2 highest levels – even though the Type 6 has not yet been fully developed. This was not what that small group wanted. You might recall the huge “stink” raised when United Airlines merged with Continental. United was under the same authority to deviate but continued to use Level D simulators for those purposes, but Continental had been granted and had used the authority to use FTDs for those same purposes.
It was THIS that made up the primary differences between the management officials at the 2 airlines AND the Union representatives of each. This turned into a high priority, hotly debated issue. And the FAA stood by hoping that the specifics would not make it into the pubic venue – or if it did, they were hoping that “John Q Average-citizen” wouldn’t recognize the stupidity involved. It is this same stupidity that still today allows some specifically authorized airlines to replace required training tasks with other “approved” tasks, such that one major US airline had not been required to train or test in either recognition of, or recovery from, either approach to stall OR aerodynamic stalls – and had operated like that for several (likely close to 10!) YEARS!
With this recognition, some apparently reluctant FAA officials ensured that each such airline was told to ensure they were properly training and checking on stalls – as THAT was the basic premise of concerns coming out of the Colgan accident. It’s my personal opinion that had all of this been raised and the proper public and political recognition been taken, the FAA could have suffered very serious negative publicity and lots of “heads” would likely have “rolled” … some appropriately, and some not. I think no one wanted to take that risk – so better to keep it under wraps, make the changes that the Colgan factions were pounding the table about – and look like a governmental agency that responded to public pressure and once again achieved the public confidence. If the public only knew! With all of this, moving forward with an acceptance or an adoption of even a portion of ICAO 9625 just didn’t make the primary “to do” list – as you might well imagine.
Let me quickly add … I don’t believe that Mr. Babbitt was aware of the specifics with respect to the differences of opinion within the ranks, nor do I believe he was aware of the critical issues those differences included. He was briefed the way he was briefed, carefully, but not necessarily completely. And, with his own personal issues happening at just about that same time … I think a good share of the “worker level” blokes were relieved that Mr. Babbitt would not be around to look into such things – as his piloting background would likely have picked up on the seriousness of it all quite quickly.
In the “aftermath” of all this – about the time that the revised rule was being advanced to satisfy the Colgan contingent – quietly and “below the radar,” one rather senior manager retired (quite quickly) and one other was “reassigned.” No fanfare … lots of good words uttered … and we’re “done.” Unfortunately, what was done … won’t do the job … and the attitude remains. Unfortunately.
The specific reason there has been little movement in the direction Administrator Babbitt had indicated is 2-fold: first, Mr. Babbitt is no longer the FAA Administrator; and second, there was a small faction of former managers who desired, and there are some current managers apparently continue to desire, to eliminate, or drastically reduce, the requirement for simulator motion from the requirements of a simulator for a proficiency check or for the ATPC certification check. There are also many FAA Safety employees who are mightily fighting this nonsense, but without any outside look, this ridiculous attitude may not be seen for the stupidity that it really is. Motivation? Well, they
say motion is not needed. I think, and there are many who feel as I do, that the overall authorizations wind up saving the airline significant amounts of money.
If this is true (and from all I can understand, that IS true) the airline managers, echoing the statements coming from the FAA, saying the crews are “better trained” and “more competent” under the “new” training and testing authorizations (of course there is NO, NONE, ZERO evidence of this) and the airline managers echo this, and in doing so, compliment the FAA managers for having the foresight and nerve to adopt this “new thinking” … which, in turn, is a “pat on the back” of those FAA managers, and that, then, justifies their being awarded bonuses and promotions. I’ve described this as the clearest example of a non-verbal “you-scratch-my-back-and-I’ll-scratch-yours” agreement known to exist today.
And, finally, without attempting to set the US up for anything in particular, I suspect that if the US were to have adopted ICAO 9625, we would have seen other national regulatory authorities doing the same thing.