Firstly before comparisons are once again made between the levels of safety in States around the North Sea, it should be acknowledged that this was not an aircraft on the UK register or operated by a UK AOC holder.
As always with the AAIB this was a good factual report and analysis; those who were at the RAeS conference last week (Technology Friend or Foe - the introduction of automation to offshore operations) would have seen the similarities between this incident and the video clip shown of Cougar 851 in 2011 - albeit with a number of additional issues that had to be taken into consideration by the pilots.
Notwithstanding that the crew was dealt a poor hand by the operator, the 'optimistic trait' of pilots comes to the fore; believing that he had an issue with the autopilot - and specifically the collective channel - the pilot still selected the GA button after take-off. Having done this, the trace indicates that he spent a great deal of time breaking through on the cyclic and the collective controls. In fact the upper modes were working as advertised but the pilots did not trust them; their inputs to the controls acted negatively on the situation.
Does this come into the category of 'automation dependency' or not - it is not clear to me. What is extremely clear is that the conclusions reached at the conference last week about the need for a change of culture and more attention given to the issues of automation are applicable to all operators. What a pity Dancopter (and other non-UK North Sea operators) were not present at the conference; their insight into the effects of the introduction of automation would have been welcome,
Apart from taking note of the actions of the operator, I cannot see any recommendations from the AAIB - anyone else spot them?
Jim