Originally Posted by rudderrudderrat
Originally Posted by AirRabbit
However, I can say that I don’t believe I’ve encountered the kinds of PIO you describe (i.e., during Take Off or Rejected Take Off) in any simulator.
I have quickly scanned this page and the first two pages of this thread and found these comments:
Jwscud #104
"The ground handling was very over-sensitive, with PIO being very easy to induce on the takeoff or landing rolls."
FlightGlobal
"Lm2 is a patented software solution that modifies the conventional lateral accelerations applied by six-axis motion systems in full flight simulators – which frequently cause trainees to overreact, resulting in pilot-induced oscillations."
safetypee #12
… are unable to simulate true lateral acceleration, at least for a significant period covering de-crabbing and during roll out. ... because there is no sideways ‘seat of the pants’ feeling for feedback."
wangus #22
"I completed my first TR in Jan / Feb (A320) and found the Level D sim impossible to land well, in all scenarios.... Sim killed my confidence, the real thing restored it"
Many experienced pilots (I would say over 50%) find the ground handling of the sim during take off & landing far more difficult than real life. It sounds like you require the regulatory authority to mandate that such improvements be made before it will happen.
First, the comment you quoted from FlightGlobal sounds very much like the sales pitch offered by AWx. Again, it is not my intent to impugn the reputation of FlightGlobal or that of David Learmount, but that quote sounded very much like it could have been part of an advertising brochure. Additionally, as I indicated previously, I have it on pretty good authority that those specific words have been used by the developer of this algorithm, and his “forceful” personality is apparently approaching legendary status in the world of simulation engineering “geeks.” So, an article that was specifically looking at this particular product, using this quote (sounding like something that the company representatives say, in that the algorithm apparently does pretty much what it is advertised to do) is not at all surprising. However, like I indicated earlier, of those in the industry who acknowledge what this algorithm does, there are some who point out characteristics that can point to weaknesses or compromising aspects of the same program.
Second, notwithstanding the quotes from Jwscud, safetypee, and wangus, and without meaning to criticize or disparage any of them or what they say, and while I fully acknowledge that there are specifics of almost any simulator about which some pilots can, and often do, offer criticisms (some of them very specific, some quite general, but all of which certainly convey personal concerns or objections), and without attempting to sound self-centered or anything approaching some kind of “paragon of truth or accuracy,” the fact is that I have had the opportunity to fly a substantial number of simulators, not only in the US but around the world, and most of the airplanes they represent. Certainly, this does not come close to including
every simulator currently in service. However, as I said, the simulators I have flown have not demonstrated the kinds of PIO during Take Off or Rejected Take Off described in these pages. Now, that may be because I have flown such a broad spectrum of so many airplanes and simulators, that I’ve become immune to some of the minor attributes that often crop up in any given piece of machinery built to replicate/simulate another piece of machinery; however, I’m not at all convinced that this is the case.
What I am saying is that if any regulatory authority were to believe that the competency of pilots being trained and/or checked using simulators that have the kinds of problems described here, is being compromised, they would likely have little option but to either remove the authority to use simulation, or those specific simulators, or at least those specific tasks from those specific simulators for the training and/or checking of those pilots.
To make the case that has been claimed here, someone would likely have to document it ALL, as completely as possible, and as clearly as possible, and present that information to whatever regulatory authority is appropriate. If that regulator were to believe that a sufficiently robust case has been made, they would likely share that with the other regulatory authorities with whom they regularly confer. Again, presuming the accuracy of the data and the potential issues that might arise as a result, it would make sense that the regulatory authorities would, en masse, mandate that such lateral cueing be improved. Again, it is my opinion that no regulatory authority would require any simulator sponsor to purchase a particular product from a particular source – rather they would invariably address the technical requirements that would have to be met in order to achieve the level of fidelity deemed appropriate, and leave each sponsor to their own methods of achieving those ends.
The other alternative would be to make the same case to individual airlines or simulator sponsors (either one at a time – or several of them together) and convince them that additional fidelity is required (in this case, lateral fidelity) to better ensure that crewmembers would be trained and tested against appropriate standards using equipment that allows those standards to be met using the newly established fidelity standards. The question that would wind up being “the elephant in the room,” is why should they take this position and spend whatever monies might be required to either purchase the programming and appropriate support, or provide for the additional training of their own simulator maintenance/engineering staff so that their own personnel would have the capabity to provide that same end. The remaining issue would be cost – since actually doing this would be completely voluntary. The answer to this issue is very likely what I was told a hundred years ago by a very astute trainer … and that is “while training is expensive, it is nowhere as expensive as an accident.”
Beyond those alternatives, I have only one additional relevant suggestion ... below.
Originally Posted by rudderrudderrat
I think we need more competition between the sim manufacturers - like there is between the airlines.
The competition factor between simulator manufacturers is probably one of the very few logical events, other than the end points I’ve pointed out, above (either regulatory requirement or sponsor recognition of competency to avoid accidents) that might achieve the end points that have been outlined in your posts.
If the simulator manufacturers were to be put on notice that further simulator acquisitions would be directly dependent on any such purchases including the established level of lateral fidelity (and you would very likely be asked to provide some specifics with respect to what fidelity measurement you would find acceptable) the degree to which this might be realized is the degree to which simulator manufacturers were factually convinced that without such additional fidelity their simulator sales would likely suffer. Logically, such suffering would be in direct relation to the level of support that could be mustered from current and future simulator users/purchasers or those who use the services of simulator manufacturers for their maintenance and servicing requirements. The caveat is, clearly, that without the simulator manufacturers being able to independently verify the accuracy of customer demands for this additional fidelity, such ... well, threats ... would very likely be essentially worthless.