I'm afraid family business diverts me, but my impression of some recent posts is that too many believe all this was a revelation to the MAA/MoD, so pre-2010 can just be ignored. This ongoing deceit taints everything the MAA does.
I also outlined in simple terms the process by which one can mitigate such risks, even in the face of rejection by higher committee. I imagine this did not go down well in MAA/MoD, because it goes against the notion, repeated above, that transference of risk to the SofS or a more senior rank/grade somehow absolves the junior of any obligation. One has an over-riding duty of care. Key staffs at a junior level (not a contradiction!) also have it written in to their Terms of Reference that they can over-rule such decisions using "engineering judgement" - especially if it mitigates Operational Constraints. Again, MAA/MoD don't like hearing this. Also, mandated regs require Industry appointees to initiate action, and they are given financial delegation to empower them. Not applicable in this case as the solution was already known, but the principle stands. MAA/MoD don't like this either. This attitude militates against the system working as intended.
Nor has the concept of "reasonable" time to mitigate before the clock runs on litigation been mentioned. That becomes a risk in itself, and potential mitigation includes getting off your ar*e and doing it yourself, if you know the solution - regardless of higher ups. In 1994 I was faced with precisely such a critical safety constraint/risk and took legal advice. The concept was well understood then, the advice was good, I progressed mitigation despite being told not to, and it was in-service in early 1996. My point is, this is not rocket science (it is a basic competence) and simply note this happened to me at the same time CWS was being progressed under a Technology Demonstrator Programme. The Submission to OR(RAF) in 1998 that Distant Voice speaks of was rejected; and at that point the time factor became "unreasonable". In the Risk Register, there should be at least one annual entry in each risk history, outlining who made the annual LTC bids and who rejected the programme, yet again.
By the way, having read the 1998 Submission, DDOR1(RAF) staff did a cracking job from 1991-96. But the Submission, and the completed work it describes (i.e. good to go for production in 1996), also make clear that the Tornado project office in MoD(PE) and support office at Wyton (?) would have been fully aware of events. It would be in their Risk Register, and a back up plan would (should) be in place that would be something along the lines I described above. Especially as further Development was minor, which is always a risk. CWS had been fully trialled and deemed acceptable by 1996. That mitigated most major procurement risks. Again, don't be taken in by the brief to Hammond (which must have involved the MAA), when in December 2013 he claimed CWS could not have been in Tornado in July 2012.
Fox3 - excellent posts.