2 May 1990, a day of sadness. It was the day that the crew of the Shackleton, that had crashed in the Outer Hebrides returned home to Lossiemouth. RIP all, their return was to play a part in this story, which shows how occasionally, the ground engineering element of C130 support occasionally fell a little short. It was to be the start of a few days away that made me think seriously about Aircrew defect reporting, and subsequent abuse of the NFF (No Fault Found) by us ground tradesmen. I apologise beforehand for the length of this missive, but some heard about it, I lived it, and it gives a flavour at least of "how we were". I also accept that its only my version of events, I would welcome any input from others who "enjoyed" the trip.
So, I was detailed as the AGE on a five day trip that would run as follows. Night stop Lossiemouth, next night Gib, Lossiemouth, Gib flag Lossiemouth for Lyneham. There were two bonuses. The two night stops Gib came with an off base authorisation, at the time an allowance of £100 sterling, and probably the best rate on the planet (Kerching, as they say). Lossiemouth of course was in the Mess. The second bonus was the crew, all chaps I had been down route with before, and all top men. The skipper, who I will call BJ, was a particularly pleasant bloke, and extremely professional in his approach to the trip. We all knew each other, and I hope had a professional attitude to getting the job done.
So, day one, leg was Lyneham To Lossiemouth, and a civilised departure time due to the short flight time. As was my habit, having stowed my yellow box of tools, and personal baggage, I joined the Eng on the Flight deck for a coffee and a peruse of the F700 while awaiting the arrival of the "royals" from Ops. We both noted in the defects log that the aircraft had been snagged twice for rather large pressurisation fluctuations in the past week. Both times it had been investigated and cleared as NFF by the line lads. Well, who were we to argue, but it was something that stood out prior to departure. The front end eventually turned up, and off we went, northbound for Lossiemouth. In the cruise, and for once not in my hammock, my ears started "whanging about" horrendously, on discussing it with the crew, we all agreed that it started just after we had passed through some light turbulence, but made no sense with respect to the pressurisation system. As we had around 16 hours on the ground at Lossiemouth, I said I would have a look and see what I could find. After The A/F, loading of one small box in the middle of the freight bay between the MLG walls, I made use of a couple of the VASS lads to do a pressure run using the inboards only, and had achieved "max diff" before ATC told me to shut down, as the aircraft returning the Shack Crew was about to land. I complied immediately, shut Albert down, and could only tell my Air Eng, that I, like my Lyneham Line compatriots could find no fault. Now is a good time to recharge your glasses chaps !
Next day, we prepare to depart for our £100 bonus. I'd never stopped "off base" at Gib, and it seemed that we had been put in a very nice hotel. Apart from the box in the middle of the freight bay, we had a passenger, an RN Lt Cdr, on his way to Gib to join an exercise. So off we went. And all was fine, I arranged myself on some para seats in a well known resemblance of a GE in flight, and looked forward to a nice warm arrival in Gib. Somewhere over the Med a couple of hours later we hit a bit of turbulence, and I woke up with a lot of pain in my ears. The Navy chap was also suffering. As I woke up, I had positioned myself on the para seats immediately aft of the RH MLG (Right Hand Main Landing Gear), I looked up and saw a big gap between the RH MLG sidewall skin, and the angle fittings used to attach the centre wing section to the fuselage (Drag Angles). Noticing also that the RH MLG soundproofing was being sucked in to the sidewall, I stood on the cargo, and removed the soundproofing. A crack, around 12 inches long presented itself, busily farting out our pressurised air, and obviously having something to do with the fluctuations we were experiencing. I asked to go on the flight deck, and discussed it with the Eng and the Captain. Now the Captain wanted a look, so we went back to the freight bay, and he had a good look at what was happening to his aircraft. The crack, the drag angle, none of it looked good, and after his return to the front seats, he took the decision to divert to Porto, which was off to our left. We landed, I prepared an Eng Rep ( Engineering report) and duly dispatched it to Fatcock and Lyneham Ops. We had found the reason for the pressurisation fluctuation, and were all in agreement that it could not have been found, without the flight loading on the aircraft.
I have to digress very slightly, my experience to that point, apart from obviously passing the famous C130 AGE course (noted as being the hardest thing to pass in the RAF) I had previously been employed on Base 3 (major servicing) of Albert, and had served for several years as a team leader on Field Repair Squadron (formerly 71 MU) and was authorised to carry out repairs to primary aircraft structure. I was no newcomer to structural damage, so my Eng Rep was clear and concise in what I had found. I requested that Lyneham send the RAF Structural Assessor, using the Gib Schedule, due overhead the next day, who could advise on the status of our aircrafts structure. If that were done our passenger could be picked up to join his detachment too. This took a couple of hours, and I was grateful that both Captain and Eng stayed to help me both A/F the aircraft, and compile our report (including detailed diagrams). Our arrival at the hotel was met by a receptionist informing me that I was required on the telephone. My "friendly" Flt Sgt from ops had decided to communicate with me. Chief Tech Smudge, he said. "I'm not sure how many times I have to tell you that the Hercules does not go unserviceable for structural problems. You are to tell the Captain that in your opinion it is safe to continue the route with the aircraft as is". Well, what part of go away fornicating did he not understand ? Particularly as my Captain was listening in on an extension line. I explained what we needed, and whilst the Flt Sgt only informed me that I should make the most of my last trip as a GE, he confirmed he had read the Eng rep, and understood my suggestions. The next thing was a message for the Captain from Fatcock. Chief Tech Structural Surveyor to arrive on re routed Gib Sched in the morning. Prep pax and freight for transfer to the Sched, and take it from there. Once again, Command show at least some understanding of our situation. We now get to the nasty bit.
On arrival, the structural surveyor looked at his copy of my Eng Rep, and compared it to what I showed him. I had located a piece of paper in the cracked MLG skin in flight, which had now closed up, so the paper showed the crack clearly, likewise the wing attachment angle had been given the same treatment. On having a bit of a tug, he pulled out around six securing rivets on the angle, just by hand. His obvious knowledge of the structure led us to the rear RH MLG strut track, which had a long crack, most of the way down its length, and several very solid attachment bolts (around half an inch diameter) sheared off or missing altogether. We both agreed, it looked like the aircraft had had a very heavy landing, that went unreported, and developed to the current state. His decision was that the aircraft was unfit to fly, until some fly in repairs were carried out. He compiled a complete report on the damage found, and sent it off to Lyneham, not Fatcock. We then headed for the hotel to await developments. At the hotel, our surveyor briefed the Captain on what he had found, his recommended course of recovery, and answered any questions about the structure involved. So, the skipper was quite comfortable with the situation when he received to phone call from my friend, the Flt Sgt in Ops at Lyneham (he was a persistent bugger), who told him that OC Eng Wing had read the report, and that the aircraft was safe to fly back to Lyneham tomorrow morning. Skipper says "put OC Eng on the phone then", Oh, he's stepped out at the moment says Flt Sgt. "Well get him to phone me back when he steps back in" says the skipper. Next we receive a signal/FAX from Lyneham, telling us that, on the authority of the Station Commander, OC Eng Wing was authorising one flight, unpressurised, gear down direct to Lyneham on the next day. The skipper had it in writing, and put it to us that he would have to comply with such an order. There was no discussion as far as I remember, only that our structural surveyor said he wanted a civilian air ticket back to the UK (he eventually came home with us). The flight back to Lyneham took around 7 hours as I remember, was particularly worrying as we encountered more turbulence at the lower altitudes, and I watched the crack in the sidewall extend by over an inch during the flight. The surveyor could not be coaxed from the bottom bunk, it would have taken a tyre lever to get me away from that crack.
It turns out that on the evening of the last signal, the Station Commander had not been appraised of the situation, and that the signal/FAX had used his authority in a less than genuine light. Whatever, we got back, I spent a few more years as an AGE and as for OC Eng ? Well, for some reason he was short toured. Surprisingly I was never interviewed or questioned about my part in it, there was usually some sort of post mortem on such events. But the piece of skin with the crack in it,removed by the Marshalls fitter, when repairing the sidewall remains in my possession to this day. The structural surveyor made it fairly clear that he would not do "down route" surveys in future. And the crew from that route remain top of the pops in my book. Fact is, as I proved myself, finding this fault on the ground would have been difficult in the extreme, the leaks came as a result of pressure differential, and the different flight loading on the structure in flight. In later years we had an Aircraft on air test from AES that exhibited the same characteristics. Knowing the Flight Test crew at the time, I was allowed to go on the second air test, after no fault could be found on the ground. We pulled some sound proofing off and asked the Captain to put a little G on, crikey did the pressurisation fluctuate. The Portugal Jobby was a funny old event, and my second "stoppage" due to structure. I'm sure any other ex GEs reading this will have a chuckle. Perhaps some were blighted with particular snags. I apologise for such a long post, perhaps I should have written a book instead. But for me, it's another memory of supporting Albert down route.
Smudge
