Hi chrisN
Many thanks for your clarification – and I appreciate, very much, how you took my response … and, also, I admit a twinge of “jealousy” in that gliding is something I’ve watched in amazed interest for a quite a large number of years – I actually worked with one of the primer glider instructors in the US for quite a number of years – and have never flown one – I guess because I’m afraid I’d screw up the landing and need to “go around.”
Today, I think that a good share of the accidents/incidents in the airline industry could easily be attributed to some aspect of “technology” – or at least the misunderstood way in which it should be operated, or the way(s) in which it provides the information that it is supposed to provide – and, unfortunately, the culprit that is growing most in its contributions to accidents or incidents is the over dependence on automation to save one’s backside. Personally, I think that kind of “over dependence” on automation played a major role in the accidents of both Asiana Flight 214 and Gulf Air Flight 072.
Of course having ALL the facts of any accident or incident is paramount in making any decisions about the cause or causes. But there are some issues that almost jump off the page into your face. In these 2 accidents, it is quite clear that no one in the cockpit was paying any attention, or certainly not enough attention, to what the automatic systems were doing – or more appropriately NOT doing. What is surprising to me is how long 2, supposedly competent, aviators sat right there, with all the controls available on the airplane and consciously decided to “leave the flying to us.”
I’ve spent a good portion of my career involved in training and simulation issues – and it is clear, at least it’s clear to me, that there was something very definitely lacking in the training provided to the pilots in these 2 cases. I don’t think there was any specific task left out of the training provided to the pilots in question – but certainly there was a significant lacking in what was trained in at least a portion of the tasks that were addressed throughout the training they all received. My guess is that if one could go back and watch a video of the training that these pilots actually received – somewhere along the line an astute instructor could very likely point out when and where the omission was made and how it was made. Unfortunately, there is a good probability that the same omission was made, time after time after time.
And the reason I can say this a bit more forcefully is that the guy sitting in the right seat of the Asiana flight was supposed to have been a former instructor. That tells me that what he was seeing is what he would have expected to see in the simulator or that someone routinely provided a subtle “hint” as to what that pilot should do and when. However, even then, this “former” instructor simply sat there and let the other guy wait on the automatics to “kick in.” At some point, the instructors I know would have had a “not-beyond-this-point” clearly identified, at least to themselves, and had the pilot flying not taken control manually or made the appropriate correction to the automatics, when that point was reached, they each would have taken control of the airplane, and, depending on the point they each decided for themselves, would have manually controlled the airplane either through the landing or initiated and flown a missed approach/go around.
So it’s not necessarily a matter of some specific addition to any specific training program – it’s more of an assurance of what instructors are to teach, how they are to teach it, how they make corrections (when appropriate) and how they determine that each student has reached a point where that student can be legitimately defined as “competent.” It comes in stages, of course – and periodically throughout the remainder of any yet-to-be-accomplished training aspects, a good instructor will either boldly, or surreptitiously, slip in something to verify that the student really has “learned” what he/she was supposed to have learned. It's not "rocket science" - but neither is it something that can be "plugged in" or "unplugged." It is a cultural thing, based on sufficient and adequate training of the instructing staff.
You described a “pyramid” of aviation abilities … of course there certainly is a “pyramid” of sorts, with the most proficient aviators at the top. However, the difference I see is that the pyramid has to have a predetermined base level – and each and every airline pilot (at least for my discussion point) MUST be able to be at or above that base level of abilities or competency - that is a combined level of satisfactory knowledge and personal performance on each and every task that each pilot may potentially be asked to accomplish. Sure, there may be others who are better in some areas – but everyone in that pyramid should be basically competent in each and every task – broken down into each control use, each cross-check accomplished, each trim adjustment, each and every everything, including what passes as acceptable performance – must be able to be demonstrated at that minimum level of competency – or that pilot should do something else for a living.
And the reason I can say that, and say it unapologetically, is that, someday, one of my family members may be on THAT pilot’s airplane.