Originally Posted by chrisN
Air Rabbit, what sort of training scenarios, in your ideal world, would you have wished for the Commander of AF447? And for its two FOs? And for the pilots of Asiana? And for the pilots in the Gulf Air Flight 072 which plunged into the sea (Somatogravic illusion)? And for the captain and FO of Airblue Flight 202 which crashed on 28 July 2010 near Islamabad? And the FO on American Airlines 587 (use of rudder in wake turbulence)?
I could go on – Helios oxygen system, Staines Trident, etc. etc. – all involved pilots not doing it right, but in so many different ways.
Is it practical to train for all these in some generic ways, so that people do the right situational analysis, don’t fixate on the wrong problem, and do take the right corrective actions?
Wow, chrisN – I guess you believe that my comments are either “off the mark,” “irrelevant,” “overly simplistic,” or a combination, perhaps all, of the above. It may surprise you to know that my world is no more “ideal” than is your world. It may also surprise you to hear that I’m not a terribly big believer in “training for” a recently occurred accident. Sure, there is probably nothing wrong with demonstrating what a crew may have encountered, or observed, either approaching or through-out a sequence of events that preceded, or were present during, the on-set of the accident or incident. BUT that is not what you asked. I believe that the training that is provided to pilots should provide them with a complete and accurate understanding of what kind of “control” that pilot has over the condition of his/her airplane (and by “condition” I mean attitude, configuration, and the ability to achieve either more or less airspeed) and what kind of limitations may be inherent with any specific condition with respect to the airplane achieving any other condition.
Obviously, the amount of “control” a pilot may have over any of these “conditions” changes with the specific condition in which the airplane is in currently, and what condition is desired by that pilot. This is the reason for including a somewhat comprehensive listing of “in flight tasks,” tasks with which the pilot is usually familiar. As the task unfolds during the training, differing factors come into play – some (but only some) are orchestrated by the instructor – that may well entice the pilot to make adjustments in either the “plan” they have determined mentally – or may cause an overhaul of that plan completely – maybe even abandon the process for which the flight crew was planning and progressing, in favor of a plan more in line with whatever circumstances have most recently been recognized. All of this provides the pilots in training an opportunity to ‘think through’ the circumstances they face … and good instructors often get a lot more training accomplished through strategic altering of the conditions presented to that flight crew.
And, before you ask, no … there is no “course of training” that exists (to my knowledge), or should be developed, to address “airplane conditions.” But, as the pilot is taught the tasks that make up the training syllabus, the combined instruction on each such task should include the information/facts that allow the accumulation of such knowledge. For example – you referenced somatogyral illusions. As you probably know, but for some who may not, these are illusions involving the semicircular/somatogyral canals of the vestibular system of the ear that occur primarily under conditions of unreliable or unavailable external visual references and result in false sensations of rotation. The results of these kinds of illusions, particularly with new-entry student pilots, include the leans, the graveyard spin and spiral, and the Coriolis illusion. Did anything like this happen in any of the accidents you mentioned? What do the investigations reveal? While I would not absolutely rule-out any such involvement, I think there are much more likely and more identifiable causes for each of these cases.
Here’s a link to more information on this subject:
Sensory illusions in aviation - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Actually, most of these kinds of “sensory illusions” have been, certainly
should have been, addressed, or at least introduced, during basic flight training – and some even introduced prior to allowing a student to “solo” for the first time.
Additionally, you should also know that there are currently several international “working groups” focusing on just these factors – and there is at least one such working group currently looking at what kind of training should be designed and incorporated for training of the instructors and evaluators. We ARE moving in the right direction.
You ask if it is practical to train for all these situations in some generic way … so that pilots would be able to analyze the situation in which a pilot may find himself/herself, and not identify the wrong problem and thereby take the proper corrective action. Of course, THAT is the ultimate goal of virtually ALL training programs. The best way that I’ve seen to do this very thing, is to employ competently and completely trained instructors to teach a competently and completely constructed training program, using the very best of training aids available. In my book, the most meaningful training aid introduced into the aviation community has been the simulated airplane – initially those devices were … well … as good as they could be AT THAT TIME – however (!) we’ve advanced by several orders of magnitude in the last 50 years! Today, simulation is the best it has ever been … now, we have to be sure that we train our instructors on how to best use that equipment! A part of that training simply has to include a focus on where any specific simulation device is weak with respect to its fidelity to the airplane, in either performance or handling qualities; what tasks must be trained, how they should be trained, how to recognize the difference between competent understanding and indecisive luck, etc., etc.
Additionally, we should recognize that from time to time, we will very likely recognize a necessity to expand the kinds of things that really need to be trained – the following is an example of the most recent change to the requirements in the US, published by the FAA as part of its training regulations for airlines:
§121.423 Pilot: Extended Envelope Training.
(a) Each certificate holder must include in its approved training program, the extended envelope training set forth in this section with respect to each airplane type for each pilot. The extended envelope training required by this section must be performed in a Level C or higher full flight simulator, approved by the Administrator in accordance with §121.407 of this part.
(b) Extended envelope training must include the following maneuvers and procedures:
(1) Manually controlled slow flight;
(2) Manually controlled loss of reliable airspeed;
(3) Manually controlled instrument departure and arrival;
(4) Upset recovery maneuvers; and
(5) Recovery from bounced landing.
(c) Extended envelope training must include instructor-guided hands on experience of recovery from full stall and stick pusher activation, if equipped.
(d) Recurrent training: Within 24 calendar months preceding service as a pilot, each person must satisfactorily complete the extended envelope training described in paragraphs (b)(1) through (4) and (c) of this section. Within 36 calendar months preceding service as a pilot, each person must satisfactorily complete the extended envelope training described in paragraph (b)(5) of this section.
(e) Deviation from use of Level C or higher full flight simulator:
(1) A certificate holder may submit a request to the Administrator for approval of a deviation from the requirements of paragraph (a) of this section to conduct the extended envelope training using an alternative method to meet the learning objectives of this section.
(2) A request for deviation from paragraph (a) of this section must include the following information:
(i) A simulator availability assessment, including hours by specific simulator and location of the simulator, and a simulator shortfall analysis that includes the training that cannot be completed in a Level C or higher full flight simulator; and
(ii) Alternative methods for achieving the learning objectives of this section.
(3) A certificate holder may request an extension of a deviation issued under this section.
(4) Deviations or extensions to deviations will be issued for a period not to exceed 12 months.
(f) Compliance with this section is required no later than March 12, 2019. For the recurrent training required in paragraph (d) of this section, each pilot qualified to serve as second in command or pilot in command in operations under this part on March 12, 2019 must complete the recurrent extended envelope training within 12 calendar months after March 12, 2019.
Below are listed the specific accidents you referenced along with a very brief description of the accident provided by the investigative authority involved:
July 6, 2013, Asiana Airlines Flight 214
The NTSB concluded that the flight crew’s insufficient monitoring of airspeed indications during the approach resulted from expectancy, increased workload, fatigue, and automation reliance and that the Pilot Flying’s faulty mental model of the airplane’s automation logic led to his inadvertent deactivation of automatic airspeed control. In addition, Asiana’s automation policy emphasized the full use of all automation and did not encourage manual flight during line operations. The flight crew’s mismanagement of the airplane’s vertical profile during the initial approach led to a period of increased workload that reduced the pilot monitoring’s awareness of the pilot flying’s actions around the time of the unintended deactivation of automatic airspeed control. Insufficient flight crew monitoring of airspeed indications during the approach likely resulted from expectancy, increased workload, fatigue, and automation reliance. Furthermore, lack of compliance with SOPs and CRM were cited as additional factors.
23 August 2000, Gulf Air Flight 072
The A320 with 143 passengers and crew on board approached the landing at higher speeds than normal and carried out an unusual low altitude orbit in an attempt to correct the approach. The orbit was unsuccessful and a go around was attempted. While carrying out a turning climb, the aircraft entered a descent at 15 degrees nose down. The aircrew did not respond to repeated GPWS warnings and approximately one minute after starting the go-around the aircraft disappeared from radar screens. There were no survivors. There were 36 children on the aircraft. The accident investigation concluded that the primary cause of the crash was pilot error (including spatial disorientation), with a secondary factor being systemic organizational and oversight issues.
28 July 2010 Airblue Flight 202 crashed near Islamabad
This accident was primarily caused by the aircrew who violated all established procedures for a visual approach for RWY-12 and ignored several calls by ATS Controllers and EGPWS system warnings (21 times in 70 seconds) related to approaching rising terrain. The Captain violated the prescribed Circling Approach procedure for RWY-12; by descending below MDA (i.e., 2,300 feet instead of maintaining 2,510 feet), losing visual contact with the airfield, and resorted to flying a non-standard, self-created PBD based approach, transgressing out of protected airspace of maximum of 4.3 NM into Margallas, and finally collided with the hills. The Captain not only clearly violated the prescribed procedures for a circling approach but also did not at all adhere to FCOM procedures of displaying reaction / response to timely and continuous terrain and pull up warnings (21 times in 70 seconds) – despite these very loud, continuous and executive commands, the Captain failed to register the urgency of the situation and did not respond.
On November 12, 2001, American Airlines Flight
The A300-600 took off immediately after a Japan Airlines Boeing 747-400 on the same runway. It flew into the larger jet's wake, an area of turbulent air. The first officer attempted to stabilize the aircraft with alternating aggressive rudder inputs. The strength of the air flowing against the moving rudder stressed the aircraft's vertical stabilizer, and eventually snapped it off entirely, causing the aircraft to lose control and crash. The NTSB concluded that the enormous stress on the rudder was due to the first officer's "unnecessary and excessive" rudder inputs, and not the wake turbulence caused by the 747. The NTSB further stated "if the first officer had stopped making additional inputs, the aircraft would have stabilized."
Obviously, I don’t have a lot of knowledge of what each of the above crews were exposed to, were required to understand, or what the thought processes where that each may (or may not) have discussed with either their flying partner or their instructors. However, I can say that each investigation clearly noted what, in the respective professional opinion of the investigators involved, was “at play” in each of these terrible tragedies. Do I believe that these tragedies could have been avoided through appropriate training earlier in the respective careers of the pilots involved? … Absolutely – Yes. However, I don’t mean being exposed to training on a task that would have mirrored the conditions into which each of the above airplanes was flown. However, training on operating the airplane, including at least some depth into how the airplane was to be flown, could have made a significant difference. The first three examples seem to have a common thread of having made a decision and on 2 of these 3 examples there was an unchallenged deviation from what was logical, and very likely, deviated from what would have been expected, and in all 3 examples, there was an apparent “closed-minded” attitude of acting upon and completing a specific decision – even to the apparent and complete disregard of the on-board warning systems.
The 4th example, the AA587 accident, the pilot flying actually experienced 2 successive encounters with the vortices generated by the preceding B747. The first of these encounters was handled quite satisfactorily, and, in fact, again notwithstanding my aging brain cells, the first recovery from inadvertent wing-tip-vortex encounter was suitable to have been included in a text book, describing “how to do it correctly.” What happened on the 2nd such encounter allows only speculation. He had literally had
just demonstrated the correct recovery process, and now he completely abandoned that process. I have speculated that he had not yet “gathered his wits” from the first encounter when his airplane was yet again struck with yet another, very likely a more “robust,” wing-tip-vortex. I think that took this pilot by surprise. I think he was so surprised that he quickly slipped into what I would characterize as a “panicked response.”
Further, I believe that:
1) This panicked response initially resulted in a “pilot induced oscillation.”
2) I think he either didn’t recognize the PIO or did not know how to recover from one.
3) I think he was not aware of the sensitivity of the controls, particularly of the rudder, and how much rudder he was getting with very little force applied, and
4) I think he was unaware of how little pedal deflection generated full surface deflection.
Also, because the certification of any aircraft includes a maximum rudder deflection, held at maximum deflection, and then released to neutral. Also, if, instead of releasing the control to the neutral position, the control is moved to the opposite side at maximum deflection – the loads on the structure go up dramatically. And IF the maximum reversal deflection is achieved while the structure is moving in the opposite direction, those dramatically increased loads are again dramatically increased. And IF, on top of all of this, the reversal is repeated several times, and includes reversals while the structure is moving the other way … well, you get the picture; we are definitely in an uncharted area.
My question here would be, how does a pilot, having the training, background, and experience of this particular pilot, become apparently unaware of these limitations … or … did his panic-induced actions preclude him from recognizing and/or understanding what would help and what would exacerbate the problem?
Apparently, some airlines train to use the rudder. Others train to NOT use the rudder - remember the UA B747 departure out of SFO? That pilot used the rudder, and dependence on the rudder was proper and very likely resulted in the happy ending that ensued. So, which is correct … use it or don’t use it? Airplane designers put a rudder on airplanes for a reason. Clearly, it can be used for other applications, both to the benefit and to the detriment of the safety of flight. Wouldn’t it be nice if ALL pilots were trained on the proper use of all the available flight controls – and how their use can be a detriment to the reason they are in training?