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Old 2nd Jul 2014, 22:56
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Bill Serger
 
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Read this NTSB report from the mid 70's regarding TWA flight 841. A 727 that fell from flight level 390. The old style flight recorder showed 6g and 470Kts at one point.
I am glad you brought this up, because 470 knots is 80 knots over Vmo for the aircraft involved, and it suffered severe structural damage.
The No. 7 leading edge slat on the right wing was missing. The slat tracks remained on the aircraft; the outboard track was twisted and bent rearward about midspan, and the inboard track was bent rearward near the aft end of the track. The slat actuator cylinder was broken about 1 1/2 inches forward of its trunnion; the aft portion of the cylinder remained attached to the wing. The forward end of the actuator cylinder, the actuator piston, and the piston rod were missing. The 5/16-inch bolts that attach the slat to its track were sheared, The inboard fairing-adjustment T-bolt was broken, and the threaded pqtion of the bolt and two adjusting nuts were missing...

The skin of the lower surface of the wing aft of the No. 7 slat actuator was scraped. An 8- to 10-inch portion of the outboard aileron balance tab was missing at the end of the scrape mark. The balance tab actuator lugs had separated, and the hinge support fitting between the lugs had sheared.

The right outboard aileron actuator hinge fitting bolt was broken. With the aileron in the locked-out position, there was free movement of 1 inch up and 3/32 inch down at the trailing edge of the aileron. The nut end of the bolt remained in the structure. A metallurgical examination of the bolt indicated that it had failed predominantly in fatigue.
The No. 10 flight spoiler panel, except for a portion containing the two inboard hinges, was missing. The right inboard trailing edge flap track attachment bolts were sheared and the carriage was damaged. The canoe-shaped fairing for the track was missing.
The No. 7 leading edge slat, which had broken into two pieces, and the outboard trailing edge flap track canoe-shaped fairing were found about 7 miles north of Saainaw. Michigan, at latitude 43'39'N and longitude 84%5'W. A large portion of the No. 10-spoiler panel was found about 3/4 mile south of these components. The forward portion of the No. 7 slat actuator cylinder, the actuator piston, and the piston rod were not found. The piston rod-end bearing remained attached to the slat; the rod had fractured in overload about 2 inches aft of the center of the bearing.
A metallurgical examination of the No. 7 slat inboard T-bolt indicated that3 the cross section of the bolt had fatigue fracture characteristics. There was considerable smearing of the fracture face.


Both main gear landing doors and their operating mechanisms were damaged3 extensively and a hydraulic line was ruptured. The sidebrace and actuator beam on the right gear were broken; the support beam for the left gear was intact. The uplock for the left gear was bent. The secondary wing skin panels above both actuator support beams were buckled upward.
The No. 4 flight spoiler was torn around its actuator attachment point....
The left outboard aileron balance tab hinge fitting was broken; in the locked-out position, there was no appreciable free movement of the aileron.
Many passenger oxygen masks were hanging from their overhead compartments. A passenger service unit was loosened from its moorings and an interior window was cracked.
The "A" hydraulic system reservoir contained 2 quarts of fluid. Following repair of the hydraulic line in the right wheel well and plugging of the No. 7 slat actuator lines, the reservoir was serviced and the flight controls and speed brakes were checked; they functioned properly. Except for the No. 7 leading edge slat, the leading edge slats and flaps, trailing edge flaps, and their indicator lights functioned properly on both the normal and alternate flap systems. The inboard could not be tested because of the damage to the right inboard trailing edge flap. The stall warning and overspeed warning systems functioned properly.
Slight tension-field wrinkles had formed in the fuselage skin fore and aft. - Source - http://www.airdisaster.com/reports/ntsb/AAR81-08.pdf

I wouldn't want to test that in an Airbus.
Well, that depends I suppose.
The dive speed [Vd] is the absolute maximum speed above which the aircraft must not fly. Typically, to achieve this speed, the aircraft must enter a dive (steep descent), as the engines cannot produce sufficient thrust to overcome aerodynamic drag in level flight. At the dive speed, excessive aircraft vibrations develop which put the aircraft structural integrity at stake. Source - VD/MD | The Flying Engineer

Scroll down in the above source to see the video of flight testing certification out to the A380 Vd/Md.

FAR 25.301, 303 and 305 do not pertain a 1.5 Factor of Safety in relation to speeds. In other words, if Vd were 400 knots, the 1.5 Factor of Safety defined under FAR 25.303 would not offer a 'margin of safety' in speed of (hypothetically) 420, or, 450, or 500... or 600 knots (1.5 x Vd).

Is there anyone here who disagrees?

Last edited by Bill Serger; 2nd Jul 2014 at 23:08.
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