AtomKraft: Yes, as they descended onto the glide slope from above.
Sorry, no that was not the reason.
While intercepting from above may be common in AMS, the reason why the A/T was idle in that flight was NOT because of intercepting from above, but because the throttle retarded as its logic told it to do thinking it was on ground as it was indicating -8 (number by recall, sorry if slightly off).
Resultant the crash, all 737 crews were made aware of the existing system limitations and relationship between the A/T and RA1, which until then was only known to the few who had in-depth system knowledge.
Hence when RA1 failed, without a failure flag , but displayed erroneous readings with indications showing the aircraft was on ground (or actually a few feet lower than normal when on ramp), the A/T retarded as programmed to do when RAD ALT <~27ft.
Failure of the operating 3 crew members to monitor the approach and instrumentation led then to a stall situation, the aircraft's autopilot trying to maintain a 3 degree glide path while the engines remained at idle, speed bleeding off... the rest is history.
The accident report is available, please read this before posting your reason as stated (intercepting from above) for failing automatics behaviour which should have been monitored by crew who failed to intervene accordingly.