From page 34 of the ATSB report just released:
End of flight scenario
Note: Given the imprecise nature of the SATCOM data, it was necessary to make some assumptions regarding pilot control inputs in order to define a search area of a practical size. These assumptions were only made for the purposes of defining a search area and there is no suggestion that the investigation authority will make similar assumptions.
The limited evidence available for MH370 was compared with the accident classes listed previously.
In the case of MH370, there were multiple redundant communications systems fitted to the aircraft (3 x VHF radios, 2 x HF radios, SATCOM system, 2 x ATC transponders). However, no radio communications were received from the aircraft after 1719.29, 7 hours prior to the last SATCOM handshake at 00:19. Analysis of the SATCOM data also showed that there were probably no large changes to the aircraft’s track after approximately 1915, about 5 hours prior to the last SATCOM handshake.
Given these observations, the final stages of the unresponsive crew/ hypoxia event type appeared to best fit the available evidence for the final period of MH370’s flight when it was heading in a generally southerly direction:
loss of radio communications
long period without any en route manoeuvring of the aircraft
a steadily maintained cruise altitude
fuel exhaustion and descent
This suggested that, for MH370, it was possible that after a long period of flight under autopilot control, fuel exhaustion would occur followed by a loss of control without any control inputs.
Note: This suggestion is made for the sole purpose of assisting to define a search area. The determination of the actual factors involved in the loss of MH370 are the responsibility of the accident investigation authority and not the SSWG.
Once again, expensive assets redirected on what seem to be very speculative assumptions. Unless, of course, there is significant evidence that has not been made public.
Here's a New York Times article with an overview of the ATSB search area report:
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/27/wo...light-370.html
This discussion of possible MH370 waypoint and airway routing is on pages 36-37 of the ATSB report:
MH370
Radar data showed that after take-off MH370 tracked in accordance with its flight-planned route to waypoint IGARI and then turned right towards waypoint BITOD. Secondary radar data was lost shortly afterwards. Primary radar data then showed that MH370 deviated from its flight-planned route.
Primary radar data showed that the aircraft tracked along the Malacca Strait. During this time the aircraft passed close to waypoints VAMPI, MEKAR, NILAM and possibly IGOGU along a section of airway N571.
Southern air routes/waypoints
Air routes and waypoints were then examined to see if there was any correlation with the possible southern tracks for MH370 obtained from the analysis of the SATCOM data. Relevant southern air routes that MH370 may have intersected/traversed were N509, N640, L894 and M641. Waypoints associated with these air routes were also considered as possible points on the MH370 flight path.
N509 ELATI 0200.0S 08957.7E
PORT HEDLAND
N640 TRIVANDRUM
BIKOK 0817.0N 07836.0E
COLOMBO
LEARMONTH
MOUNT HOPE
ADELAIDE
L894 KITAL 2003.0N 06018.0E
MALE
SUNAN 0028.7S 07800.0E
DADAR 0200.0S 07927.1E
PERTH
M641 MADURAI
BIKOK 0817.0N 07836.0E
COLOMBO
COCOS IS
The waypoints at MUTMI and RUNUT were also considered as possible points that MH370 may have crossed. However ground tracks through these points did not correlate well with the most favoured paths generated through the analysis of the BFO and BTO data.
Air routes/ waypoints summary
Although waypoints and air routes were examined and compared to possible tracks derived from analysis of the SATCOM data, there was insufficient evidence to positively determine whether MH370 intersected any waypoints associated with published air routes in the Southern Indian Ocean.