What I miss in the NTSB report are remarks about the stall protection feature of the 777. Did it in this case work
for them or
against them?
If I am not mistaken the 777 has a feature that the closer you are to te stall speed the harder you have to pull the yoke. I think it stops trimming at a certain speed.
YES ik know they should have made a GA at 500ft and YES more things went wrong. BUT when I read
this:
As the airplane reached 500 ft above airport elevation, the point at which Asiana’s procedures dictated that the approach must be stabilized, the precision approach path indicator (PAPI) would have shown the flight crew that the airplane was slightly above the desired glidepath. Also, the airspeed, which had been decreasing rapidly, had just reached the proper approach speed of 137 knots. However, the thrust levers were still at idle, and the descent rate was about 1,200 ft per minute, well above the descent rate of about 700 fpm needed to maintain the desired glidepath; these were two indications that the approach was not stabilized. Based on these two indications, the flight crew should have determined that the approach was unstabilized and initiated a go-around, but they did not do so. As the approach continued, it became increasingly unstabilized as the airplane descended below the desired glidepath; the PAPI displayed three and then four red lights, indicating the continuing descent below the glidepath. The decreasing trend in airspeed continued, and about 200 ft, the flight crew became aware of the low airspeed and low path conditions but did not initiate a go-around until the airplane was below 100 ft, at which point the airplane did not have the performance capability to accomplish a go-around. The flight crew’s insufficient monitoring of airspeed indications during the approach resulted from expectancy, increased workload, fatigue, and automation reliance.
I have the feeling we are missing something.
I see the following scenario:
- Long flight, tired, wrong timezone, "your head says night, your eyes say way to bright".........recognize that feeling?
- Two pilots not comfortable with a visual. (NOT GOOD at ALL, but we all know those guys DO exist)
- Just before 500ft instead of adding the necessary power or making a GA the poor guy starts pulling the yoke. BUT why did he not notice the drop in airspeed?
Was it just:
The flight crew’s insufficient monitoring of airspeed indications during the approach resulted from expectancy, increased workload, fatigue, and automation reliance.
Or was there more? Why was he not suffently monitoring the airspeed? And why did it take him so long to start doing that. Could it be that the protective system distracted him? He pulls. The speeds drops. He has to pull harder, this distracts him even further. Tunnel vision on the yoke..........situation out of control even further?
YES I know, without the feature he might have stalled the aircraft, but do we know that for sure? Was this optimal protection?