Ah, understand thanks. I am indeed losing it or over-interpreting...!
I read the posts earlier in the thread earlier, (and again, now) - I was looking at the "80%" figure more broadly and not in the rare specific cases cited. It's not a matter of belief, the stats are indeed there, (I was thinking training scenarios, etc).
While the sample rate is to small (Tarom, Colgan, Thomson, Turkish...are there others?) to take this statistically-seriously, I could understand the notion that it, (pulling up and in some cases not adding power), at first warning of a stall, should never occur in such a high-risk event does take us beyond statistics into a mandate to do something.
In this then, I don't think it is possible to over-train.
I believe in Gladwell's notions, (Outliers). I play an instrument which is both a cognitive and muscle-memory activity and the only way to play accurately and fast is to practise, practise, practise.
Both cognitive response time and muscle memory improve dramatically and, (if one is performing in public, which I certainly do not!), reduces performance anxiety, and startle tremendously regardless of whether it is an airplane, typing on a keyboard, playing the piano or reciting/speaking text from memory. The mind-and-muscles "go to the right place", to loosely describe it.
I know you and many here know this already - it isn't new, though Gladwell has put a refreshing interpretation on it. Here, not only was there not a correct response, (or a response to incorrectly-perceived cues) but no concept of what was about to rapidly happen to the aircraft's energy in a sustained climb. There seemed no concept or awareness of an airplane's physical state or environment. It should not be possible to get into the cockpit of a transport aircraft absent these basics.
In the light of AF447 especially, but also in view of the "80%" perspective, I wonder what our regulators consider "stall practice" these days?
I know that in Canada, once one has been initially certified for the airplane, there is no requirement whatsoever to demonstrate approach-to-the-stall or stall recovery in fly-by-wire aircraft. I have no idea what the justification is for this because it seems to imbue FBW technology with some form of magic when it's just another way of moving the flight controls. I suppose they're thinking of the Airbus protections but we all know now that a more sophisticated approach to such training needs to be done. What do the JARS have to say?