Dozy, re:
However what bothers me about writing off the consequences of what has recently been termed "startle response" as a
Quote:
Originally Posted by PJ2
psychobabble notion created by non-pilots/non-aviation people
is that while the industry has - as he said - been dealing with scenarios such as this for a very long time, the fact remains that there is always room for improvement.
I was well aware of fear/fright factors from the day one of my private licence and have felt such fright as all pilots do, a number of memorable times hence, from the early years right up to the year of my retirement. Such things are visceral and not subject to "improvement", (thank goodness). But physiological and psychological human responses which sublimate rational responses may be mitigated, as I went to some trouble to define, by thorough training, an abiding mentality of cockpit discipline when the going gets interesting, and recent developments borne of the results of such cockpit chaos and rapid loss of SA as we see in the AF447 cockpit; these developments are known as CRM and SOPs.
To me, the cockpit is where the buck stops; it is those hands and minds that govern everyone's lives on board. But that does not excuse or turn focus away from organizational circumstances which "planted the garden" for this failure.
But truthfully, really, there is some hindsight bias at work in this. In terms of this organization and the larger industry, was UAS on anyone's radar as a top training priority? No, it was not, even bearing in mind that much had changed since the two initiating accidents which brought the loss of airspeed information into the industry's 'consciousness' from which it created the UAS cockpit responses. AF had addressed the issue as early as 2006, providing training as to when and how to apply the UAS drill. As with other professions with similar responsibilities and authorities, the standard is constant learning and engagement over and well above the formal recurrent training schedule and requirements. I don't think that's too tough a standard at all but, again similar to other professions, some do "just come to work"...
We all know that thirty-one other crews experienced this event and for all of them it was a log-book entry, just as it should have been. I'm sure each one would verify an initial fright - in fact one would wonder about a pilot who did not exhibit that initial reaction. To be sure, there was "startle", (if that's the way some want to put it), in every one of these events - I can tell you that there was such during a subtle failure of airspeed info (blocked pitot - airspeed acting as altimeter) on a B767 over the Rockies one dirty night!). But that's what training, SOPs and CRM are for - to replace fear quickly and provide the road map forward which sublimates initial fright to engender disciplined action. It works - thousands of minor incidents like this occur in airliners every day and they are non-events.
Gann would also have known and intuitively appreciated that 230T of mass does not lose energy in a few seconds to the point of falling out of the sky; - there is a "pilot's (sixth) sense" regarding the airplane involved here which seems to have been missing in the crew combination of AF447. A number of things come to mind: - the lack of clear command-and-control structure left by the captain and engendered by the airline, (ie, the F/O in the left seat should have taken control but out of deference to structure, did not), the possibility that sublimation of the airplane's situation, (ie, "not-serious-but-requiring-attention"), a desire to "do something" which led to the instantaneous, (2-second) reaction by the PF to remembered-drills for UAS done right after takeoff in the sim instead of doing 'nothing' for the moment, (as I had suggested in June, 2009).
Stall warning or no, there is nothing unclear about buffet, an unwinding altimeter that is going through FL's once every three seconds and the inability to arrest a 10,000fpm rate of descent.
I think OG has nailed the PIO matter. I've tried it in the sim, (not just the UAS sim session). The reducing oscillations are to me a successful response to the very sensitive roll that the airplane has in roll-direct; the PF got it under control. The sustained and increasing pitch is significant enough to be separately-intentional and not a result of inadvertent input while getting the roll under control.