Gums,
Both Dozy and PJ2 (a former A-330 pilot) did recovery exercises in the SIM. Going back to the original AAF447 Thread #9, this is what PJ2 had to say about one of his recovery attempts:
Post 168 AF447 Thread #9
In the sim exercises, for recovery the SS was held full nose-down from the beginning of the stall warning at about FL360 until the wing was unstalled at about FL250, about 40 seconds total time, with a maximum achievable ND pitch of about -12 deg with an average of -10deg. The thrust levers were in the CLB detent and the THS was initially at 13.6deg and was returning to the normal cruise setting.
With the FPV symbol available, the FPA could be observed just above initially at -40deg, (pitch -10deg).
It began to move, initially very slowly up, about 15 seconds after full ND SS;
- at 29 seconds after full ND SS, the FPA had moved from -40deg, (pitch at -11) to -25deg, (same pitch);
- in the next 5 seconds it moved from -25 to -15, (FL257);
- at 38 seconds after full ND SS the FPA was -9deg, (pitch -5deg) with the wing unstalled and the CAS at 255kts.
One other thing that I think is important from a AF447 historical perspective that PJ2 pointed out discusses "Startled" in a collection of posts:
"Startled" is an invented, psychobabble notion created by non-pilots/non-aviation people in an industry that has been dealing with transport emergencies and abnormals and improving on checklist design, system design and crew performance for same, for over fifty years. Why suddenly does the notion of being "startled" in an airliner cockpit have the currency that it does instead of being examined for what it is actually saying?
Is the trend towards relatively low cockpit experience with commensurate reducing skill standards in combination with highly-automated aircraft technologies where a pilot can now be overwhelmed by anything just beyond training and experience, finding new expressions in terms like "startled"?
If "startled" is the new metric when examining human factors in aircraft accidents then there are some serious questions to be asked of those processes upstream from putting crews into transport cockpits who can handle the profession and the job.
And finally,
I am unconvinced of "startle" - everyone is 'startled' to begin with - I have experienced a massive hydraulic failure on the same equipment and yes, it was initially startling but one reverts to training and deals with the ECAM accordingly. I have no idea why it came apart so swiftly and we'll never know. All we can do is re-emphasize what would have saved this airplane, this crew and these passengers, because this was not an emergency and there was no requirement to do anything other than ensure the airplane was stable while the ECAM drill was done according to Airbus SOPs.
I like PJ2's thoughts here, in effect, everyone is startled when something unexpected happens, it's what you do or don't do after being startled that determines the outcome.
A last point: There is a difference between stall prevention, given the warnings and what is done to recover from an actual stall. This Airbus presentation discusses these differences on pages 11 & 12:
http://fucampagne2008.u.f.f.unblog.f...lprocedure.pdf
Cheers!