Deskboundphixer
The reason I'd use the perfectly good instructions and procedures I was brought up on is this. I wouldn't trust the MoD/MAA to come up with anything better.
I recommend everyone read the MAA's document MMA02 "Master Glossary".
There are an alarming number of "intentional blanks". Take the first one, in alphabetical order - "Acceptable Deferred Faults". OK, there are a few here who don't give a toss about such things, but most do. Is everyone content the "Authority" can't offer an authoritative definition? Does that mean training on the subject is deferred as well?
What about Post Design Services? There is a definition, but it is wrong. The Chief of Defence Procurement's Instructions (CDPIs), which were meant to replace Controller Aircraft Instructions, made exactly the same mistake in 1993; which is why we reverted back to using CAIs even after they were withdrawn. Like I'd still do today.
The proper definition? "Maintain the Build Standard". Simple. Says it all. Why is it important? Because the Safety Case is based on a maintained Build Standard, and the RTS provides a release against a defined Build Standard with a valid Safety Case.
Relevance to Rivet Joint? The Build Standard has not been maintained, and cannot be resurrected or stabilised.
Programme Management 001 - Stabilise your Build Standard otherwise you cannot possibly satisfy mandated Configuration Milestones. See Rivet Joint.
If the MAA get it wrong, who can blame those who are wrongly taught, never appreciating just how important the subject is. That, however, does not absolve those who WERE taught correctly but knowingly suborned the regulations and condoned cancellation of contracts that were meant to maintain Safety Cases. Example: Nimrod. Remember, that's why we need Rivet Joint.
And then add this to Wg Cdr Spry's defintion of "Functional Safety", which is also dangerously wrong. There is a long way to go, and the MAA is not the answer.