Some of us may remember from the PelAir & Pilot training Senate inquiries the sensible, rational contributions made, both in submissions & hearing appearances, from the AIPA mob...
Many on here may say that AIPA and it's members (by design) are too far removed from the current machinations and sheer embuggerance being subjectively inflicted upon the GA (IOS) industry.
However it should also be remembered that most of the AIPA members hail originally from a GA background and although they've reached the pinnacle of their careers as professional aviators, they owe a lot to the grass roots of the industry.
Many AIPA members also still actively participate at a recreational, private pilot/aircraft owner level while employed and once retired. There is also the significant fact that AIPA depends on its existence on actively promoting the aspirations of future aspiring airline pilots (WANNABES).
IMO this puts the AIPA, and other similar {big end of town} airline unions/lobby groups, in rather a unique position as being far enough removed to give an objective view of the current status quo of our ailing industry. Therefore it was with some interest that I read
sub #197 from AIPA. This submission is measured, somewhat politically correct (and many may not totally agree with the recommendations) but it does show that Nathan Safe & crew are totally plugged in when it comes to the ToR of the ASRR...
The AIPA passage on the ATsB provides an excellent starting point and IMO summarises perfectly the current problems, (of our once proud aviation safety watchdog) of the ATsB, while highlighting the importance of preserving a totally independent State AAI..
SOB 
:
The ATSB
In October 2012, AIPA made a submission to the Australian Senate Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport References Committee Inquiry into Aviation Accident Investigations (the “Pel-Air Inquiry”). The Committee’s final Report is a vital document for the Review.
However, we believe that our submission for the most part addressed a range of issues that remain directly relevant to the Review’s Terms of Reference and we strongly recommend that you read it separately from the Senate’s final report. It can be found at: https://senate.aph.gov.au/submissions/comittees/viewdocument.aspx?id=31a52199-58c6-4cd8-ad9e-646f2356b23a
For the present purpose, we do not believe that we need to quote large slabs of our Pel-Air Inquiry submission. However, the following brief synopsis will not do justice to the detail of the argument in our submission nor will it establish the full context. Subject to that caveat, what we said was:
• the ATSB report on the ditching was too little, too late to improve aviation safetyas a result of that event;
• the standard of the report was the antithesis of that expected from the ATSB by the broader aviation community;
• the report appeared to have been rendered of little use by the dead hand of bureaucracy, which then raised questions about why that might have been the case;
• we questioned whether an over-emphasis on the ”no blame” philosophy has overshadowed, if not obscured, the importance of the ATSB’s primary role to improve transport safety;
• we then examined the seismic shift in the relationship between ATSB and CASA from the Lockhart River Coronial Inquiry and the publication of the Pel-Air report;
• the Miller Review was commissioned to redress the “serious, ongoing animosity between” CASA and the ATSB;
• Miller came from the law, which is all about allocation of blame and punishment, to review the relationship with an organisation that eschews those very tenets;
• Miller’s recommendations were adopted by Government and the ATSB was pushed into the background;
• Miller, undoubtedly for all of the right reasons, stated:
“…Ultimately, the ATSB's contribution will be judged, not by the quality of its analysis, conclusions and safety recommendations per se, but by the influence those recommendations have on improving the aviation safety system.”
• we didn’t think it appropriate to judge ATSB against the inaction of those to whom the safety recommendations are addressed; and
• the ATSB became “institutionally timid” and essentially stopped making safety recommendation of any note, but enjoyed a vastly “improved” relationship with CASA.
While clearly AIPA’s submission straddles the first and second objective of this Review, the reality is that the Senate Inquiry largely underlined that the effectiveness of the ATSB had largely been sacrificed in the interests of not upsetting CASA. Had the same Senate Committee inquired into the Lockhart River accident investigation, it is highly likely that it would not have been the ATSB that was side-lined in the aftermath.
AIPA maintains the view that the large scale adoption of the Miller recommendations has had the effect of negatively influencing the true intentions of paragraphs 12AA(1)(b) and (c) of the Transport Safety Investigation Act 2003 (TSIA) by repressing the independence of the ATSB and suppressing holistic examination of the aviation safety system.
AIPA’s submission specifically questioned whether CASA’s role in the aviation system was being adequately scrutinised, but the harsh reality is that the same question could be asked in relation to any of the agencies directly or indirectly influencing aviation safety. Current knowledge, post the Senate Inquiry, suggests not.
AIPA believes that the ATSB has a very clear duty under the TSIA to independently and holistically examine the aviation safety system. Pandering to the ego or behaviour of any stakeholder is anathema to the principles under which the ATSB was established and AIPA strongly believes that the safety message should never be lost in the telling. We strongly support the notion of the ATSB as the watchdog of agency influence on aviation safety.
Recommendation 3
AIPA recommends that the Minister for Infrastructure and Regional Development issue a directive to the ATSB clarifying that paragraphs 12AA(1)(b) and (c) of the Transport Safety Investigation Act 2003 require holistic examination of the aviation safety system, including the regulatory framework, and that cooperation and consultation with stakeholders must not be permitted to compromise the independence of the ATSB or the making of safety recommendations.
Nonetheless, AIPA recognises two important factors: first, the current generation of senior ATSB managers may find it difficult to step out of Miller’s shadow; and second, the ATSB is not and never should be a routine auditor of the aviation safety system. AIPA believes that the latter function requires a Machinery of Government change to redress a number of aviation safety governance issues. We will elaborate on that proposal later in this submission.
In regard to the appointment of the ATSB Executive, AIPA is very conscious that ‘profiling’ has its limitations and that the key to success is very much about ‘the right stuff’’ and less about career paths. We will always have a preference for operational experience in executive positions of entities that have a profound influence on aviation safety, regardless of what type of entity is involved. ‘Operational experience’ includes experience as a safety specialist or as a regulator that can be shown to be appropriately proximate to the actual conduct of flight operations. AIPA recognises that there may be a need for appointments within the ATSB Executive for career public servants, but, subject to our ‘right stuff’ caveat, we have deep reservations about such appointments at any level above Deputy CEO (however designated).
TOP STUFF AIPA!
Suggest IOS take the time to read the whole AIPA submission it is definitely worth the effort...MTF