@Winnerhofer:
Admittedly the OCR/translation tools at my disposal are crude, but I can't find a reference in that letter to either Dubois or Bonin being former cabin crew.
Furthermore, as far as I can tell the source seems to be something of an inveterate writer of letters on various subjects - all the others I've found seeming to be unrelated to aviation.
Originally Posted by
angelorange
The FO and SO on AF447 were sponsored fast track JAR "integrated" students Who had minimal time on hand flown machines then straight intoFBW automated Airbus 320s before burning thousands of hours on autopilot in the a330/340.
First point - I don't know of F/O Robert's history, but I do know that F/O Bonin was an accomplished sailplane (glider on this side of the pond) pilot. You can't push buttons to fly one of those, and to say the least to fly gliders well requires a very thorough knowledge of aspects of flight, including energy management and stall avoidance.
Second point - With due respect it's a bad idea to get FBW and automation confused or conjoined. They are two very distinct concepts with very different roles.
Even the big JAR/EASA "integrated" and MPL schools admit 80% of these students are scared of flying in light aircraft, scared of stalling and more interested in a lifestyle than aeronautics.
Bonin was not one of these - see above re: gliders.
Add in the stupid stall recovery taught for min height loss instead of angle of attack reduction BEFORE adding power on FAR25/EASA25 machines and very poor simulator stall replication plus Airbus myth about TOGA and angle of attack protection and you have such a sad waste of life.
As the original thread discussed, what you are describing is not a stall *recovery* procedure but a stall *avoidance* procedure. The industry as a whole shifted focus in recurrent airline training to avoidance rather than recovery - meaning that there were pilots whose last stall recovery procedure was flown as part of their PPL exam.
In the wake of AF447, both Boeing and Airbus worked together to develop new procedures and training materials to bring recovery back into the picture.
I'm a little unsure what you mean by "Airbus myth about TOGA and angle of attack protection". Could you elaborate?