Is it just me? while happy to have the latest report and some 'facts' to consider, the wording of the ATR investigation seems a bit – 'twee', for the wont of better, fluffy or something:-
The first five paragraphs are totally and utterly irrelevant. Except 20/02/14 VH-FVR departed schedule Sydney – Canberra – Sydney.
That's a full page of fluff to say Routine operations to Canberra and until TOD Sydney. Why bother?
Then later we get the high drama of a runway change 16 R to 16 L – then the information that – surprise, surprise, the Seat belt sign was on and the checklist was almost complete. Nothing of any great value so far - and we are now at paragraph 10. Where the FO started the descent – on AP. Wow, invaluable, that's way cool. Are you not diverted? Ah, but wait – now we come to it.
At 1640 and about 8,500 ft, the crew noticed the airspeed going up quickly and the speed trend excessively high. The first officer reduced engine power and used touch control steering to temporarily disconnect the autopilot before manually raising the nose to control the speed. The aircraft felt ‘heavy’, requiring the first officer’s two hands on the controls to move from the then -4° pitch angle (aircraft nose-up/down). The first officer expected that the pitch correction would be sufficient to arrest the speed trend.
Deconstruct the paragraph, I'll give you a start – airspeed "going up quickly" ; they were 235 KIAS, top speed 250 KIAS; define time line, provide ROD, provide TOAT, provide wind, provide temperature then think inversion layer or, sheer line, or updraft, or stable mountain wave; or even trim fault. But airspeed going up "quickly" is just 'fluff'. Anyway – power off – trim up – two hands - no fix – why not?. Was the auto trim running against the FO input?, had the skipper got his boot braced against the prong? This is a definitive moment and we get "speed going up quickly".
The captain was unsure if the first officer’s control inputs were sufficient to avoid an over-speed so put one of his hands on the controls and disconnected the autopilot to raise the nose further.
Watts on first, Who on second etc. etc. for the next three paragraphs. Then a paragraph worthy of a channel 7 headline, just before an advertisement break :-
To both crew members, what happened next was unexpected and unclear.
High drama indeed.
Suddenly, the crew felt high positive g,[3] the controls felt different and spongy, and cockpit warnings activated.
Somewhere, as yet undefined, between TOD, the "suddenly" moment and 230 KIAS stable; a leg got busted, the elevator channels had split and despite previous "heavy" and "spongy" feeling controls – "suddenly" all is well again - except for some annoying warning lights.
Grounded – Oh, you bet! Engineering next. Despite the window dressing, duty times and the like, (they do fail to mention what the engineer had for morning tea though) you get a sense of more to it. Although it may be just the tabloid style of reporting that gives the impression.
At about 2300 the engineer borrowed a nearby stand to provide a platform at about wing height.
If this is representative of the 'new' style ATSB report, the Murdoch press may be interested in using it. It's not a bad 'press release', not too bad at all – but as an interim report on a serious event......Well we got a nice picture of the aircraft taxiing in....Stellar.
Please Senators, can we have our ATSB back.