Long article best read at source particularly for 'who will fly them potential Oz F-35Bs from Oz LHDs':
Thoughts on the LHD and a fixed wing capability
30 May 2014 Commander David Hobbs, MBE, RN (Rtd)
"TO THE the logical mind, the most surprising element of the 2007 decision to build two Canberra class LHDs was the acceptance by the Australian Government of advice from a lobby group that fighter aircraft based in Australia, with their limited radius of action and fixed supply chains, could provide support for these ships and their ‘all-arms’ battle groups wherever they might be deployed.
The Government had already stated its intention to procure the land-based F-35A Lightning II joint strike fighter but showed no interest in the STOVL F-35B variant (pictured) being developed specifically for amphibious operations with the US Marine Corps. Protagonists of the limited ability of ‘land-locked’ air forces to project power pointed to the availability of air-to-air refuelling to extend the range of fighters but there has, as yet, been no break-through that allows them to be re-armed in flight, and crew fatigue on long sorties must be a significant factor that degrades performance.
In 2008 the Sea Power Centre studied the relative value of shore and sea-borne aircraft and noted the observed historical fact that terminal air bases associated with distant crises are seldom secured beforehand and usually lack the capability to provide immediate support at the level of operations needed for crisis response. The same document notes, on the other hand, that embarked aircraft are fully mobile, operational to their maximum level of performance on arrival in the crisis area and largely secure from ground-based interruptions and asymmetric attacks....
...The best example of rapid and effective reaction to an unexpected crisis is the Falklands conflict of 1982. Possession of the two flat-tops, Hermes and Invincible, allowed the Royal Navy to deploy a task force with naval Sea Harriers and helicopters that were able to fight on, under and over the sea surface. RAF Harriers were subsequently able to join Hermes’ air group but it needs to be pointed out that the ship’s highly skilled aircraft handlers were able to cope with their lack of experience and naval pilots were able to teach them how to operate in a maritime environment. In other words the RAF squadron was not in its primary environment and a force that relied on it for both offence and defence would have been weaker and less effective without the naval professionals who specialised in embarked flying.
A ship that was not as worked up and specialised could not have coped with the new-comers’ inexperience and the example of Illustrious in 2007 is interesting . With no Harrier squadron of her own she embarked 16 AV-8Bs of USMC squadron VMA-542 which flew 152 sorties in twelve hours. In contrast an RAF Harrier squadron embarked in Ark Royal in similar circumstances in 2010 had to carry out several days deck landing training before being considered operational and, in the ensuing exercise, flew less sorties in five days than the USMC had flown in Illustrious in two. Unlike the Marines the RAF were not able to fly at night because of their lack of carrier experience. A land-based unit that undertakes random embarkations as a secondary function will never demonstrate full operational proficiency.
Future conflict in the Pacific region may well rely on control of the sea and that control may not be possible for navies that lack effective aircraft able to operate as an integral part of a triphibious task force. An increasing number of navies have carriers and LHD-type ‘flat-tops’ and Prime Minister Tony Abbot’s May 2014 instruction to planners working on the next Defence White Paper that they are to examine the possibility of putting a squadron of 12 F-35B Lightning II joint strike fighters onto the LHDs to “ensure that Australia maintains a sustainable, versatile and highly capable defence force” shows a ray of hope that the full potential of these ships might be realised. Fortunately their design originated from the Spanish Juan Carlos 1 which was intended to operate STOVL fighters as well as helicopters and even retains the ‘ski-jump’ (it cost less to leave it in place than to redesign the bow to remove it) but significant modifications would be needed to embark F-35Bs on a regular basis. These would include the fitting out of air weapons magazines and handling systems together with the autonomous logistic information system, ALIS, which is at the heart of F-35 operation and maintenance and other arrangements. Aircraft handlers would need training in the operation of both fixed and rotary wing aircraft on deck and sortie generation would require the installation of briefing and flight planning facilities, simulators for pilots to ‘pre-fly’ missions and maintain training standards...."
Thoughts on the LHD and a fixed wing capability | Australian Naval Institute