@Winnerhofer - to be honest, for the most part I disagree.
In general, the article seems to be based around the assertion that the flight crew are being assigned primary responsibility for the accident - which is, as stated before, fiction. In fairness, it does at least seem to acknowledge that the BEA report enumerates the known contributing factors without assigning responsibility. But it seems to ignore the fact that the Judicial Experts' Reports are also just a preliminary phase in the ongoing legal process - and nothing has as yet been set in stone regarding responsibility.
Forgive Google Translate, it's the best I can do for now:
THALES - . Failure design Pitot probes
Failure of these sensors seems to be the root cause of the air crash, leading to the sequence of events (including errors of representation drivers) to unrecoverable stall the Airbus Air France.
While the icing of the pitot probes was undoubtedly the initiating factor in the accident, referring to it as a "root cause" is inaccurate. The article itself goes on to mention 30-odd other incidents where these probes iced over, yet in all those cases the aircraft was not lost.
EASA (European Aviation Safety Agency) - Lack of certification of the Pitot probes...
The Thales AA probes met certification requirements - not just for EASA but for all international regulatory bodies. The problem arose because aircraft on the line were encountering scenarios which exceeded the regulatory limits.
AIRBUS - Failure design of embedded & automation flight control software
- Lack of understanding of man / machine interface:
AIRBUS did not properly assess the criticality of the event of failure of the Pitot probes, nor the stall could s 'result. Consequently, it did not set the appropriate procedures for dealing with these degraded modes. It was not planned special training to recover from a stall because the system prohibits any such situation even disabling the PA...
This assertion doesn't make sense. If the crew of AF447 were seen to apply a known procedure in response to the loss of airspeed data, then the article might have a point. This would consist of the crew setting the pitch angle to 5 degrees nose up etc. If that had led to a crash then yes - the procedure would be at fault.
But the procedure was not followed, and the PF pulled the nose up to a pitch angle closer to 15 degrees before even taking time to assess the situation.
AF - The procedure "IAS questionable" (procedure for the blocking probes) - Failure to pilot training -. Lack of feedback
Given multiple flight incidents involving Pitot probes Thales brand before the accident, the company had indeed asked Airbus to replace these probes by BF Goodrich probes (deemed less susceptible to icing), but had not stopped the aircraft for this operation. The procedure called "IAS questionable", defined at the time for processing cases of failure of the Pitot probes was inappropriate (it has also been changed since). Finally, Air France would not properly trained its pilots to the case of failure or recovery stall that could ensue (in his defense stall was deemed impossible by the manufacturer).
The replacement of the Thales AA pitot tubes was ongoing, and in fact it was the airlines that requested the work be a service bulletin as opposed to an airworthiness directive. As discussed above, the existing UAS procedure was primarily aimed towards scenarios involving a lower altitude - but that procedure was not followed in the case of the accident. If it had been, even though it was not tailored for a cruise-level scenario, it is extremely unlikely that the aircraft would have been lost.
Furthermore, Airbus's documentation has *always* been clear on the point that the aircraft can be stalled if the flight control law has degraded from "Normal", so the last sentence is a complete fabrication.
DGCA & BEA - Failure to take into account events precursors :
These bodies have not given the feedback on Thales Pitot probes. 32 incidents of blocking Pitot probes, listed on the world fleet between 2003 and 2009, 28 involve Thales probes. They have not issued the necessary recommendations to AIRBUS, regarding essential to guarantee flight safety modifications on its devices. Moreover, after the disaster, Thales Pitot probes complained were changed urgently on all devices.
This statement seems to be worded to imply that the 32 other incidents must have been handled by the BEA (inferring F-registered aircraft) when this is not the case. The outcome of the worldwide case history regarding Thales AA probes did indeed result in an ongoing program to replace them, and supplementary information was supplied to airlines to handle the problem in the interim. 28 incidents were logged with a positive outcome, so the idea that the aircraft would likely be endangered on every occasion is something of an exaggeration.
Crew - pilot inappropriate Reactions :
Their responsibility rests only on the basis of arguments that seem very light. The pilots of the 447 are scapegoats (too) easy no longer here to defend himself.
Not true - there has been no definitive action as yet which determines that the crew bear primary responsibility.