Boudreaux Bob: You aren't SASless are you by any chance (
). A bell in every tooth as we say over here (I detect that you are very fond of driving a wedge between us and you at every opportunity, it seems).
So permit me to make several points very clear and in plain 'Americanese':
The ONLY difference I make between us and you in this domain is the assessment of risk. IMHO, yanks push the envelope / interpret the regs much more loosely than we do (generally). Sometimes you get away with it, others - you don't. I tend to believe the UK are more subserviant to the rules/regs/legislation. Could be a good thing, might not.
Secondly - let me try to understand your stance with this irreconcilable episode:
The FAR trumps Ops Specs, (
)
Ops Specs trumps the AC and the AiM. (
)
The RFM limitation section trumps national regs? [That's a question for you].
Notwithstanding all of the above, you quote the following:
For the 350B3, the restriction to stay with the helo while rotors are turning - is removed. (Agreed).
For the 350B3 - the requirement to remain with the helicopter rotors turning during 'flight time' remains. (Agreed).
But are you also saying that:
(a) National regs trump RFM's?
(b) Flight time doesn't include ticking over on the ground rotors running?
(c) Flight time only means: "for the purpose of logging hours" and is an administrative regulation not an operational one?
As the unfortunate recipient of a sharp sudden demise climbed out of the aircraft, did he:
(a) Not understand Section 2, Page 11, 350B3 RFM: Minimum Crew?
(b) Interpret the above as: Min crew is only relevant to flight time and flight time is an admin reg therefore it doesn't apply to what I am doing operationally?
(c) Assume everything would be fine because he'd done it dozen's of times before.
There are two ways of approaching this scenario professionally:
1. Follow the limitations laid down by the manufacturer in the RFM.
2. If no limitations - then as a matter of course - safely secure said aircraft before disembarking.
(Assuming there was no serious malfunction) he appears to have done neither.
So we return to my opening statement: RISK.
RISK = Frequency x Outcome.
Perhaps the left hand side of this formula is more heavily weighted in the US of A than it might be here.
What is indisputable though, is that because of his fallibilities in the decision making department - there was a catastrophic outcome...and it was entirely and categorically avoidable. Thank Allah - no-one else was injured or killed.
I therefore strongly recommend this candidate for the Darwin Trophy. RiP.
DB - one helluva bulls eye post - you old git.
TheChopper - got it in one. - None so blind as those who will not see.........