Originally Posted by report Tarom
The PF does not seem to have noticed the THS pitch down movement, particularly given that a movement of the THS commanded by the automated systems is not announced by the “whooler”. This triggered a reduction in pitch attitude. The aircraft did, however, stall; the “Cricket” stall warning signal and stick shaker were only activated later during descent (see paragraph 2.3.2 below).
Immediately before, during and after the stall, due the unreliability of the total pressure, the ADC no longer provided speed data, resulting in automatic disconnection of the ATHR, with the throttle levers remaining in the maximum thrust position.
Just before the stall, the Captain pulled the control column* fully back, bringing the elevator to 23 degrees nose up. He then pushed it fully forward, while continuing to counter the roll of 75 degrees to the right with the ailerons. The statistical data shows that, when confronted by a stall, in 80% of cases, pilots pull back the control column, in a sort of reflex movement, which continues the loss of control.
The aircraft was subjected to a series of four full and rapid rolls. The first was attributed to the force brought to bear by the pilot on the left part of the control column; the following ones were due to pilot overcompensation on the roll then the stall. Having pulled the control column fully back and thus caused maximum nose up pitch, the pilot rectified this by pushing the control column fully forward. The aircraft dipped, with its nose going under the horizon by 32°. The roll-off from +50 to –32° in seven seconds was remarkable.
We can't know in that quote :
- which stat data ? Who ? Sim/plane ? Type ? Size and type of population ? Have these results been published in a controlled research paper, etc.
- which pilots ? (Licence, experience, recent training, fatigue, which flight school if any ? etc.
- which stall ? N? Thrust ? Other anomaly (roll, oscillations, ths, spin, aso) ? etc.
- other