One more point to the interception option, which may be moded out though.
Remeber the first days of the missing MH370?
I remeber one statement repeated for some days until the questions got painful, then the statement was demented officially. Two month later we are used to receiving information, which is revoked few days later. Therefore make up your own mind whom you believe.
General Rodzali said interceptors were not scrambled because the unidentified plane appeared to be a civilian aircraft.
What can we read out of that information:
- There would have been interceptors available.
- There are procedures implemented under those a scramble would commence
- The plane was observed and reported in time
- With the information available the plane was declared civil no threat
I do not agree with Machinebirds analysis, that the discusssion gets unrealistic.
I know no airforce around my country with no air policing procedures in force. The end of the cold war nearly 20 years ago didn't change those procedures. The necessity for the grade of readiness is defined by the advance warning available. The costs of such a readiness is negligable. Soldiers are not paid for hours and aircraft cost not more money when they are kept in any kind of higher alert state.
It is unrealistic to assume an alert state of 5 minutes over prolonged time, and nobody did that. But having an alert state of 60 minutes or 30 minutes allows a gradual increase of the alert state when situation dictates. The persons on 60 minute alert will then raise out of bed, cloth up, aircraft are powered up and when ready to launch within the new readiness state next orders are awaited.
It is no argument that the task of interception of an unidentified target may turn out impossible due to fuel exhaustion or other factors, as those factors are only known in hindsight. A target may turn and solve the range problem, or it may turn away and create a range problem to the interceptor. Interceptor forces all over the globe can be considered useless, when the possibility of failure prevents the implementation of such force beforehand.
There might still be the option that no alert force in some readiness state was available, but why would the minister of defence not dodge those questions with something like
"i can not coment in public on the readiness state of our forces...."?
He clearly expressed that it was not necessary to launch, as he had no intention to shoot it down.
AIP Malaysia concerning interceptions.
http://aip.dca.gov.my/aip%20pdf/ENR/...20Aircraft.pdf