Centaurus, many thanks for pointing out the Thai Hong Kong accident. On looking at that report you're right about the core aspect relevant to this thread, the problem of both being pilots on conflicting visual cues and not reacting to valid instrument information. However your recollection of the actual event isn't quite correct.
The ILS approach started as a "First Officer's sector" with "not too bad" weather, which deteriorated as the approach continued. This caused the (Danish) Captain to say at about 2000 ft. they would instead switch to a "Pilot Monitored Approach" as required by the Scandinavian Airlines/Thai Airways ops manual for "poor weather" approaches. They had not briefed for this and the (Thai) F/O continued as PF but under the impression he would still be doing the landing (possible language problem cited throughout).
At the same time they started getting Precision Approach Monitoring (radar "talkdown") as well, which caused the Captain and F/O to have different understandings of what DH would be applicable (Capt. thought 615', F/O and F/E or panel operator 415').
The F/E called DH at 415ft, but neither pilot seemed to register this, and the Thai Monitored Approach procedure wasn't 100% clear about criteria for the F/O to execute a go-around in the event of the Captain not taking control at DH. There was also confusion about the landing clearance received from the tower.
With both pilots head up and seeking visual cues in very poor visibility in driving rain and turbulence, and the F/O as Pilot flying, the descent rate built up rapidly. They descended well below DH with the Captain taking control and initiating a go-around at about 100ft after sighting the water, but the aircraft struck the sea short of the runway.
The accident cause was put down as "(i) The pilots did not adhere to the Thai Airways procedure for a "Captain monitored" approach in bad visibility; (ii) The Captain did not monitor the approach adequately; (iii) The co-pilot mishandled the aircraft after descending below minimum altitude; downdraughts may have contributed to the height loss which resulted from this mishandling.
There isn't any reference to the previous Taipei experience or the need for the Captain to make sure the F/O stayed head-down - can you recall any other source for this? I'd be interested to see it.
Last edited by slast; 18th May 2014 at 16:55.
Reason: Precision Approach Monitoring note