Runway Overrun Protection System (ROPS) is a very good concept except like any other automation it has to be used with care and attention to its limits.
Landing performance calculations rely on data input including braking action/runway condition, which if as in this accident were ill determined, so too will be ROPS solutions.
Will pilots have too much confidence in the ROPS pre-landing calculations? The default safety margin is 15% (shown in green), yet this is the minimum recommended value (why not show in amber) and requires significant consideration of many factors, e.g. rainfall rate, runway surface, which are not available to ROPS. Thus there could be implicit human belief that the machine is always right, whereas in this accident the initial calculations would be based on the same assumptions made by the crew.
Alerting to long flare/touchdown position is a valuable tool if heeded; will humans always follow ‘machine advice’, cf EGPWS?
Grooved runways are expensive – but not in comparison to an accident, so who pays, airport or operator. Furthermore these runways require more maintenance, more expense.