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Old 12th May 2014, 12:30
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Aluminium shuffler
 
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I still disagree with the defense of this crew. While choosing Flap 30 may be forgiveable, particularly if they were expecting windshear on approach, continuing the landing having floated so long is not, regardless of winds or surface conditions. Time and time again run-offs occur from ridiculously late touch downs, and still the idiot members of our ranks persist in trying to land from these baulked approaches. Had they gone around, we wouldn't be criticising them. Had they landed in the right zone (not a specific point, you note, but a zone), then they may have had to brake hard but would almost certainly would have stopped without a problem, even with the tail wind and wet conditions. What happened here was exactly the same as Mangalore, Chicago, Burbank and even Asiana at SFO - the pilots continued to "press a bad situation", in Hollywood parlance.

This is not an issue of technical skills. It's an issue of attitude. That is why I can't forgive such events.

I'm glad there are operators who are running training scenarios for baulked landings. Sadly, they are so few that they are near unique. It needs to be an industry wide programme.

Safetypee, my "triggers" are more than just tailwind, they are the whole performance package - high temperatures and altitudes, winds, runway slopes, approach gradients, runway length, desired exit point and surface conditions. Most of my cadet FOs process the same factors with ease and without input from me, choosing flap and autobrake settings and reverse thrust amounts very similar or identical to my own assessments and raising the same "threats" I see, or at least most of them, as they brief me on their approach. It is not some mystical and hard acquired intuition but simple application of Performance A and attention to detail. That is a combination we are all supposed to have.

As I said, making a mistake in assessing the approach is one thing, though I'd never consider making a F30 approach with a tailwind (yes, that is a "hard trigger" for me), but to do so with the conditions in this accident was grossly negligent. But the pressed landing when they were clearly so far beyond the touch down point was a disgrace, and would have been just as much so even if the approach had been perfect.
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