Al shuff, there’s no problem that we disagree, everyone has their view; it’s the difference in views which often provide the most value for safety.
You have an ‘inbuilt’ awareness / relationship with tailwind and F40. Excellent, but how was this achieved, learnt, taught; whatever that process was/is, it was apparently lacking in the accident scenario (a difference in views) – this doesn’t discount the possibility that the crew knew about F40, but just failed to recall it on the day. Your ‘trigger’ appears to be ‘tailwind’ – I fully agree with that concept.
Similarly I agree with your view of stopping distance; but how do you arrive at ‘suspicion’ – experience, intuition, (factors of airmanship)? This may be acceptable in most circumstances, but occasional it could be misjudged. Thus a better technique would be to always check the numbers, and then use these to trigger suspicion. Better still, check the performance in the reported conditions against the next worst-case scenario; this could both quantify your suspicion and define a margin of safety, the landing zone, the ability to absorb a failure (no reverse etc), …
As for the other issues, all humans lapse, we misjudge situations or inappropriately bias our plans, etc. I hope that these points can be related to the HF training given, if not, then … reconsider.
What would be unforgivable is to label others in that way with insufficient consideration or understanding of their view at the time.
It’s not for us to label, judge, or excuse other’s behaviour, but as professionals it is our responsibility to learn from what we might observed and understand.