but the thread will continue forever with all those who believe the RJ shouldn't be approved rending their clothes
While I can't think of a single post advocating this, there are indeed those who sit back in amazement that the MAA is having to go cap in hand to the Secy of State over such an avoidable problem.
Good posts from Engines. We (UK and US) have very different procedures in this area and, had our authoritative Def Stan not been cancelled without replacement a few years ago, most US companies would topple at what it asks of Design Authorities and Custodians. They wouldn't say "impossible"; only, as Engines says, others do some of it but they could easily do it if required (and paid). A major difference is responsibility for safety. We choose one way, the US another; neither is wrong but we need to appreciate the differences. One of the major problems reported in the various ARTs by IFS was the UK tendency to drift toward MoD assuming more responsibility (e.g. retaining Special Trials Fits without design incorporation), but not understanding that we were assuming more responsibility and the obligations that come with it; while absolving industry of their obligations but continuing to pay them.
If you break both systems down, the same work has to be done, but it is simply not MoD policy to have the necessary expertise or resources to do it. A simple example. In 1989 (eighty-nine!) AMSO informed the Fire Control and Surveillance Radar IPT in MoD(PE) that, henceforth, the RAF at Harrogate would act as Design Authority for the Sea King HAS Mk3 radar - brought about by a minor problem involving AMSO not bothering to train users, leading to a misconception that the DA wasn't doing his job. I simply had the DA show the supplier the archive holding the master drawings and room with the Sample & Reference Rigs, and asked him when would he have the facilities and expertise in place to maintain this minor aspect of the work, then we'd transfer it all to him. Didn't hear from him again. (Nor would MoD have the necessary resources to prepare and maintain Safety Cases, which is done on the same contract).
The US forces are an infinitely better resourced outfit and probably have such capacity, but I suspect they contract out a lot of it to industry. MoD used to be the DA on, for example, some Rolls Royce engines, but if you studied the contract RR actually did most of the work while MoD had a very knowledgeable engines specialist in charge. Nothing wrong with that, but where is the recruitment ground nowadays for such internal specialists? We don't own Fleetlands and its engine shop any more.........
But MoD has gone too far the other way, starting with the policy that we don't need ANYONE who understands how to do it. (CDP, 1996). This means we are no longer seen as an intelligent customer in many areas (yet superb in others). In practice, industry wanders off at a tangent sometimes and loses sight of the goal as there is no one in MoD to set the requirement and guide them towards it (2 entirely different skills).
In respect of the initial Chinook purchase the refusal by Boeing to assume this role for the RAF Chinook fleet caused problems for MOD.
Indeed. I've mentioned before that an RAF team went to Philly in 1993 to find out about FADEC, so they could prepare the material to "train the trainers". Boeing were horrified, as they were expecting the MoD team to train THEM. This is the reason why FADEC behaviour was so poorly understood in 1993/4. Despite MoD having two distinct teams (MoD(PE) and RAF) resident in Philly, there was no real understanding of just how little Boeing knew about the aircraft and, as Engines says, what they were prepared or allowed to release. Yet, as stated above, in 1987 the AAIB had reported to MoD that Boeing had very poor knowledge of the device that caused the ZA721 fatal crash in the Falklands. Doesn't say much for MoD management oversight, which just so happens to have been the major criticism of MoD by the PAC in their Chinook Mk3 report. We don't learn, do we?