Mr Ocean,
Those buffoons were repeatedly offered the other runway (see CVR transcript)
and still chose to stick to rwy 12, max landing wt and Flaps 30. They really
piled it on themselves. Surprised they were'nt fired.
"Buffoons"? Really? Wonder if you have read the report in any close detail. Lot of last minute traps on this approach for anyone, even the most experienced.
Up to 5 mins before landing, everything was within limits for a (preferred ILS) to 12.
Now, being told at this juncture that the runway is wet introduces a whole new set of complications. (Hell, landed at ANC several times at night in the winter with slippery runway and no word from the tower; to them, that was "normal ops"; ramps and taxiways covered in snow, no visible markings; lots of fun taxiing a 744 around there.
(back to subject...) a last minute change to an RNav 30 is not an option if not already prebriefed/set up in the FMC/crew authorised etc to shoot that approach. Forget night low level visual circling; invitation to disaster and banned by most enlightened commercial operators these days.
So, continue the ILS approach, only slightly high over the threshold, but thereafter the traps come into effect-(rain, excessive flare into black hole, no TDZ lighting exacerbating matters), float, and there but for the grace of God go many.
Flaps 30 landing? Company SOP should explain that.
How can you be unaware of an approach to the opposite runway?
Good question, and again, I doubt the veracity. Am sure AA ops would have addressed this point in the full report. As mentioned before, there must have been other factors at play here (qualification, etc}. Not everybody is cleared to go shoot RNav approaches straight off the bat.
If it is true that the Captain has been reinstated, then that is good news; "Probe, don't Punish".