Just reading through the REPCONs generally. What concerns me is the way CASA seem to just fob everything off and the ATSB accept that. Have a look at some of these responses to fatigue and other raised issues.
Regulator's response (Regulator 1)
CASA has reviewed the REPCON and the response by the aerodrome operator. CASA regularly conducts surveillance of both the relevant aircraft operators and the aerodrome and will follow up on any issues.
Regulator's response (Regulator 1)
CASA is aware of the operator's fatigue risk management policy and monitors the system in respect of fatigue risk management objectives. Risk mitigators observed include regular monitoring of roster pattern performance by the airline, adjustment of rostering rules, the ability for a crew member to opt out of a duty when fatigue is anticipated or experienced and the provision of company transport or accommodation in order to limit the fatigue effects following duty.
Under the proposed flight and duty rules which are expected to be in force from this year, it will still be up to the individual to determine fitness for duty and to make a report via the safety management system (SMS) where this is indicated under company procedures. CASA strongly recommends airline employees report potential fatigue events through the SMS, in order to identify areas where the company should focus resources to reduce operational risk, including fatigue risk.
If the reporter has evidence of the reporting culture being compromised by management actions they are invited to make a report to CASA detailing any concerns.
Regulator's response (Regulator 1)
CASA has reviewed the REPCON and notes Airservices response. CASA will include the information provided in the REPCON in planning and prioritisation of surveillance activities relating to Airservices.
Regulator's response (Regulator 1)
CASA has reviewed the REPCON and will monitor Airservices post implementation review of the new STAR procedures.
Regulator's response (Regulator 1)
I refer to your email of 22 November 2013 and 3 December 2013 requesting further information in respect of the Australian Transport Safety Bureau REPCON AR201300081 and AR201300089 about concerns regarding the proposed transition of operations from the old Melbourne Control Tower to the new Air Traffic Control tower.
Since the reporter's comments in October 2013, Airservices have rolled out the full mimic program of at least 8 shifts per controller and have issued AIC 124/13 regarding 'Implementation of interim ground delay program for Melbourne' that will be one of the mechanisms for limiting the amount of traffic at Melbourne during the first 2 weeks after cutover. Airservices have issued a number of ATC local instructions and Group Circulars, including TLI 13/0266 'Old Melbourne Tower-Cutover and Ghost Procedures'; TLI 13/0268 'New Melbourne Tower-Traffic Management Procedures'; TLI 12/0269 'INTAS Operations-Cab Procedures'; Group Circular 13/0438 'Melbourne Tower INTAS Commissioning'; and Group Circular 13/0457 'Support for the commencement of services from the new Melbourne Tower'.
CASA has reviewed Airservices' supporting Safety Case and associated documents and is of the opinion that the transition risks, including ensuring ATC competencies and ATC support arrangements, are being managed in accordance with Airservices' Safety Management System. CASA is aware that the Melbourne Surface Movement Control (SMC) position is a complex and high workload area. CASA has recommended that Airservices conduct a review of the SMC position post INTAS transition. CASA will be monitoring the results of this review.
Regulator's response (Regulator 1)
We note that there was no loss of separation and CASA does not intend to take any direct safety action with regard to this matter; however CASA will use this information to complement other information that informs us of Airservices Australia safety risk profile.
Regulator's response (Regulator 1)
CASA has reviewed the REPCON and has referred the matter to the regulator in question, as they have responsibility of oversighting the operator.
They simply never do anything.