Bob, you were discussing where rules come from. I was discussing some rules related to 0/0 take offs, and instrument take offs.
The rules on 0/0 included a risk evaluation on how acceptable it is to lose the crew and aircraft versus how badly a mission needs to be done. When in a shooting war, that risk calculus is different from other times, as I am sure your experiences would confirm. Hell, you're already being shot at!
The ITO from the oil rig and taking off on a pitch black night, no moon, IMC from a pitching deck are similar if not identical flight regimes. An ITO is what you want to be doing. When you practice it, and when you stay proficient at it, that flight event is demanding but doable. At sea, on a ship, if you are zero zero, and homeplate is the only place besides the ocean to land, a 0/0 take off isn't what you'll generally opt for ... for obvious reasons.
You had made an earlier point about judgment and rules. I remember an infamous line in our "rules" in the OPNAVINST 3710 series: nothing in this manual precludes the exercise of good judgment. (Words to that effect).
The theme weaving in and out of your posts for the past few pages is the relationship between the rules and judgment. In this accident, particularly once the pitch attitude achieved during the takeoff was revealed by the initial comments from AAIB, it is hard not to believe that a core issue is the combination of judgment and airmanship.
As I considered the RFM requirement for no less than 50 knots before IMC (VminI) for this model, I began to see what the pilot might have been trying to do, in terms of trying to fit the rules to his situation.
Nothing further, back to lurk mode.