DB, you are quite right that the inclusion of the Mull in the list of apparent CFIT events was another poster, it was I and you shouldn't have been subjected to a slagging-off for it.
Unfortunately there is a human tendency among those close to events to sometimes lose perspective and the flat refusal of some to accept that the Mull accident itself was in all probability plain CFIT (albeit associated with a great deal of appalling mismanagement by whole sections of the RAF which has no evident direct connection with the accident) is likely a symptom of that.
A lack of conclusive proof does not in any way mitigate against the familiar expression "beyond reasonable doubt". We have no "proof" that the recent Battersea accident occurred under control, but equally we have no indications otherwise, yet I hear no dissent as to what in all probability happened in that case. The physical situations appears broadly similar (poor vis, bumped into something solid) yet once a head of steam is built up the perceptions can diverge in opposite directions.
Of course it is natural to try to protect the good name of your colleagues and the appalling decision to apply the phrase "gross professional misconduct" (iirc) to the Mull pilots rightly created a sh!tstorm. That I unhesitatingly agree was wrong, utterly wrong and went a long way to achieving temperatures seldom seen in accident investigations.
But we must beware of allowing emotions to overrule logic and due process in accident investigations when all the available information (despite no conclusive proof) point to an unpalatable conclusion. That isn't an intellectually rigorous process.
Blame. Bad word in this context, an one that the AAIB at least avoid tho the military may sometimes be less conscientious. We really shouldn't be thinking in terms of "blame" in these cases, despite what the meeja say and do. We should accept reasons though, and accept that we are all human and thus subject to making mistakes. A refusal to accept that our colleagues made a mistake, or most probably made a mistake when there is no indication otherwise is equally unhelpful. The tendency to hunt feverishly and endlessly for esoteric and ever more fanciful and unfeasible mechanical reasons while refusing to consider human inputs is a common feature of all the accidents we've mentioned here. There's no doubt that the human is increasingly becoming the weak link in the chain and the sooner we take this on board the quicker we may find a way to work around it.