Back at post
#575 I drew attention to the fact that the UNSW
IRRC team had apparently made a submission to the WLR panel. Well it just so happens that the UNSW Profs, Docs etc, also made a submission (sub No 6) to the RRAT committee's short inquiry into
'Qantas' future as a strong national carrier supporting jobs in Australia' the report of which was tabled yesterday (27/03/14), see
here.
In that report the
IRRC submission was referred to (page 18 paragraphs 2.45-2.53) but due to the nature of the inquiry and the unions vs Joyce bun fight the real
significant safety issue (SSI) messages/warnings of the
IRRC submission was somewhat lost..
However as an attachment to the
IRRC submission the good academics provided a copy of their WLR submission..
.
From the outset I have to say that certain parts of the
IRRC submission makes for some very disturbing reading, anyway here is the link:
ASRR - Industrial Relations Research Centre, School of Management, Australian School of Business UNSW.
Somewhat surprising is the poor structure of the submission, which means that to a certain degree the disturbing
safety risk warnings, now and projected into the future, highlighted by the research of the
IRRC become diluted in impact. However the submission (IMO) should be essential reading for all industry stakeholders..
The ToR that the
IRRC cover with their submission:
We propose to comment on the first, third, fourth and fifth of these terms of reference. Our main concerns under each of these TORs can be summarised in these terms:
TOR 1: We have observed a climate of mistrust, ill-feeling and misunderstanding among many of the interest groups that make up the industry, and between several of these groups and CASA, which we believe has impeded resolution of many of the practical difficulties which arose in the implementation of the new air safety regulatory framework. Leaving aside the obvious factors of competitive strains on the industry and escalating industrial conflict, we think it likely that the way the EASA-based model was introduced quite suddenly, and with little prior explanation or consultation, disconcerted many stakeholders who had been adjusting over a decade or longer to the previous policy of working towards closer alignment with the US Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs), and contributed to this loss of trust. In any event, it suggests a need for CASA to work harder on its stakeholder relations.
TOR 3: Much of this submission focuses on the implementation and philosophical underpinnings of the new scheme, since this is a topic on which our research arguably has most to offer to the Review. We will work in considerable detail through three key concerns:
i. The implementation of the reforms has been uneven and beset by problems of transition, which we attribute once again to the speed with which the program was introduced and developed, and to lack of stakeholder buy-in arising, in part, from the general perception that it represented an unexplained reversal of previous CAA/CASA and Australian government policy. Largely on account of these adjustment problems, the program has so far failed to live up to any of the justifications which were made for its introduction;
ii. Underlying the implementation problems are a number of significant philosophical and conceptual departures from the traditional Australian scheme, and possibly the accepted ICAO framework. Chief among these are:
• the emergence of uncertainty about the role, authority and standing of the LAME
• the dilution and fragmentation of responsibility that accompanied the introduction of the A licence
• consequential uncertainties about the compliance of the new scheme with the continuing ICAO regulatory framework.
iii. We analyse the conflicts that necessarily exist between the underlying prudential focus of the ICAO safety framework and the rules governing Australia's market-based vocational training system, to which much of the former responsibility of CASA is being shifted (especially as regards the all-important basic examination for the grant of an AME licence).
TOR 4: We focus on the contrast between Australia's relaxed approach to the supervision of overseas repair shops handling Australian work, and the stringent regulatory approach which public concern in the US has obliged Congress and the FAA to apply to offshore providers.
TOR 5: We draw attention to the current crisis of Australia's civilian training in aircraft maintenance skills, the inadequacy of the current supply to meet future Australian needs even in circumstances of maximum offshoring, and the predicted shortfall of skilled labour supply in most regions of the world which is likely not only to negate much of the cost advantage of offshore maintenance, but to affect the viability of relying on it as a primary means of meeting Australia’s airworthiness requirements beyond the short term.
While trolling through the Senate Qantas inquiry pages I came across a tabled doc from FedSec Steve, and although he has a rather large axe to grind with AJ & Co in the interest of his members, this particular AQON should be read in context of the
IRRC submission:
Additional information from Australian Licenced Aircraft Engineers Association, received 20 March 2014.
Happy reading...
Hmm...on second thoughts perhaps not!
