This procedure is a classic example of theory vs practice, and particularly not thinking about the use of SOPs.
Inter-crew communication is a positive safety aspect in normal circumstances and to an extent as workload increases, but at some limiting point there may not be sufficient mental resources to identify a condition of being ‘maxed-out’ either in yourself or others, let alone communicate. Furthermore, human bias is to carry-on in the belief that you are able to manage and that what you are doing is adequate for the situation; but the situation or activity may not be understood because of cognitive limits.
Solutions involve planning ahead, workload management, and ‘strategic’ decision making, but of greater importance the organisational planning which could prevent crews being exposed to such situations.
There is a good description of the issue in the recent BEA ‘ASAGA’ study (sim section), around an eye catching conclusion that ‘the concept of CRM is flawed’ (something lost in translation), but does identify that there are relatively normal situations where the human can be limited and that there is little or no opportunity for intervention.
http://www.skybrary.aero/bookshelf/books/2404.pdf
A similar example might be identified in the recent 737 accident report –
http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/5...o-terrain.html
This problem represent a more general view of SOPs which are promoted as a catch-all solution, yet SOPs only cover a limited range of situations, and more often only those which can be identified beforehand in ‘normal’ operation. Thus when crews encounter ‘abnormal’ (unplanned for) situations there is no SOP, and perhaps limited mental recourse to reconsider options.
Does the industry now expect too much from human intervention, are some normal operations now approaching a limit of complexity which is beyond the average human capability, and of course consider issues of the changes in training and experience (exposure) in these situations?