Good post, FP. What I would add is the need to consider the PARTIAL engine failure case in the training and briefing. I touched on my own partial EFATO experience in an earlier post and despite the hell of a surprise, I believe that it was prior briefing, the instinctive nose down etc, previous practice in finding out minimum power for level flight, and enough knowledge about the fuel/air induction systems to juggle the carb heat and mixture, that allowed me to make a decent assessment and response.
Unless you have the picture sorted in your head before the event, what hope do you really have? Going through the "what ifs" in the situation of partial (and full) EFATOs at various altitudes is a very useful exercise. Clearly, a partial at 75' is a case for pulling the power and landing ahead. However, endlessly repeating the truisms applicable to a full loss of power are probably not the best way of getting pilots of varying ability and experience, in different aircraft, to the best partial EFATO outcome in all cases. I understand entirely the need to simplify the message for students, and to ensure the reflexes are developed as they need to be. However, I expect that for many people a more thoughtful advance analysis and associated training regime would help.
Like our Australian ATSB reports these days, the UK report on this accident looks of pretty marginal value to me. Interesting to tell the story but the conclusion doesn't go beyond the well-known (and true) observation applicable to a full EFATO at low altitude. If PPruners can rustle up the Australian stats showing the better results in full EFATOs, surely the AAIB can use those to produce a much stronger recommendation about partial failures at low altitudes - namely, pull the power and treat the failure as a complete one.
To not address in the partial power situation is to miss a large part of the story especially, I suspect, in the Cranfield case. When the rpm drops but the engine doesn't entirely stop, you've got a big decision to make in a very short period. A perfectly reasonable response by some pilots in some aircraft will be to shut down the engine and invoke the full EFATO response. In other cases, depending on the altitude, pilot, aircraft and nature of the problem, different responses are reasonable. It ought to be possible to address all the responses, at least at the CPL or instructor training level.