1) Inmarsat. Has anyone thought to ask them if they went back to the prior flight of this aircraft and verified the pings match it's known location? One you might be able to calibrate out any error from the comparison. And two, if the satcom RT had been swapped out with another aircraft, we are chasing our tails yet again.
Unless criminal or terrorist activity is ruled out completely could the pings be spoofed?
Part of a very sophisticated plan to mislead?
Remember the press coverage of the threat of a smartphone hacking the flight deck originated back in April last year and again in October 2013 in an article written by a tech consultant who explores how ACARS could in theory be used to "attack" on-board aircraft systems.
Aviation Security - FMS exploitation over ACARS - n.runs security team
The main idea for the FMS exploitation is to send some malformed data to the FMS, via ACARS, that triggers a vulnerability on the parsing code allowing us to execute arbitrary code. If the vulnerability used is the appropriate, it will be triggered before the pilot has to perform any action and the full attack can be therefore remote and straight forward.
Our motivation is to help the affected industry to improve the security of their products. We strongly believe in responsible disclosure and we and act accordingly.
n.runs professionals was founded in 2001 as a competent provider of manufacturer-independent IT.Security, IT.Infrastructure, IT.Business Consulting services.
A few days ago they made this statement;
We would like to clarify that it is highly unlikely that, whatever happened to this flight, had anything to do with any form of cyber-attack against its systems.
"Highly unlikely" doesn't quite close the door on it being totally implausible
, but my point is not that this flight was hacked and controlled by remote control but to pose a question, could the pings like other tech that is non military and electronic, be spoofed?
Probably too convoluted to be manage by a one man band?
EASA, FAA and Rockwall Collins state that Hugo's bench tests are not analogous to testing using certified equipment.
Researcher Says He's Found Hackable Flaws In Airplanes' Navigation Systems (Update: The FAA Disagrees) - Forbes
Then there is the concept of GPS spoofing. If a marine nav system can be spoofed with a briefcase sized transmitter, so too could an aviation system??
sing a laptop, a small antenna and an electronic GPS “spoofer” built for $3,000, GPS expert Todd Humphreys and his team at the University of Texas took control of the sophisticated navigation system aboard an $80 million, 210-foot super-yacht in the Mediterranean Sea.
“We injected our spoofing signals into its GPS antennas and we’re basically able to control its navigation system with our spoofing signals,” Humphreys told Fox News.