SS & others - the message doesn't seem to be getting through that:
a) if a pilot operates the aircraft i.a.w. RFM,
AND
b) if he understands the fuel system as he should,
AND
c) if he pays attention to whichever CAD captions are showing,
AND
d) (OPTIONAL - as I'm fully aware of both benefits & pitfalls of limited knowledge, but would rather they had some (which we encourage) than none)
if TFOs have some understanding of the aircraft / captions / systems,
then it should not really matter whether there have been multiple sensor/CAD failures since . . .
1) if there's any doubt, there's no doubt - a safe landing at or before MLA or calculated (briefed) endurance should be the minimum expected, with any "embarrassment" being dealt with later,
AND
2) you just don't turn
both transfer pumps off, if there's any thought or suspicion that you might have fuel in the main tank.
Lots of "if"s above, but I'd argue that they're part of what's expected. Having flown the 135 for 10+ yrs, I just don't hold with the multiple failure theory, since there's certainly enough duplication in this aircraft, especially for those who know their systems, to have taken some mitigation action earlier.
Working close to limits serves to sharpen the mind, as previously mentioned.
efish 
- I am as suspicious as
wageslave 
, but if you were to try any game like that with our team, on a Police task; at night; at anywhere near that fuel state; whether CAD/captions were possibly working or not; you'd more than likely find yourself having a "robust debrief" with your TFOs which would probably bring all CRM skills to the fore!
In transit, by day, at a higher fuel state - maybe, but it's just not a viable theory in this discussion, IMHO.