Careful Engines. With posts like that you’ll be labelled a “usual suspect” for advocating safety on an aviation forum!
Then we get to the next level up: Where was the MAA's 'Oversight' Division? What about MAA 'Surveillance'? When was the last MAA audit of the PTs?
If I may take one point. Oversight. MoD has been criticised before for lack of oversight. On Nimrod MRA4, which was cancelled because the aircraft could never be “certified” (Hammond, House of Commons 3rd Feb 2014), the Public Accounts Committee confirmed a “lack of management oversight”, with MoD claiming the individual could not be identified. (See Management Plans or Staff Lists of the day. It was Director General Air Systems 2, which about 3000 people at AbbeyWood could have told the PAC). This individual upheld disciplinary action against civilians for refusing to obey orders to ignore airworthiness and financial probity regulations, and directed that aircraft need not be functionally safe when delivered but a declaration could be made that they were. Ministers upheld his rulings and DE&S continue to do so. In other words, it would have been mighty inconvenient for him to be named.
A similar scenario exists within the MAA. What if, for example, a former IPT leader, responsible for delivering and maintaining the Safety Case, is now a senior officer in the MAA when an audit is ordered? The audit reveals it hasn’t been maintained for about 20 years and, therefore, the RTS has become progressively invalid and unrepresentative. And there is a raft of evidence to prove it. Oh, and dozens have died while the aircraft was unairworthy, and the recommendations of a major report remain unactioned for those 20 years. Does the senior officer declare a conflict of interest? Does he seek a move from the MAA? No; what happens is nothing is said and he continues his so-called oversight role, even advising Ministers. Yet, highlighting this gross failure and accepting it for what it was – a systemic failure affecting all MoD – would have helped prevent subsequent accidents. Perhaps Sean Cunningham might have been killed anyway, one can never say; but there would have been a Safety Case and the failure to implement servicing instructions would have been flagged. His defences in depth would have been more intact. Can we have any confidence in such a system? How to avoid it? A truly independent MAA.