PAPI "Issue" is Irrelevent
That the TCH was 47.7 ft, not 60-75 ft, which is the minimum for Height Group 4 (A300), is not relevant to this accident, considering the events, in my opinion.
Had the crew paid any attention to the PAPI, used its advisory vertical path information, the airplane would not have collided with the terrain. Even the beginning of "4 reds" would have kept them safely above the terrain.
The FO and the Captain missed both the 100 ft above and the Minimums calls, at which point the decision to continue or go-around should have been made. At Minimums, if they saw the runway, then the PAPI would already have shown 3 or 4 red lights. So a difference of 13-15 ft of TCH is a non-factor. (This is clear from Figure 9b of the Aircraft Performance Group Report.)
The aircraft crossed IMTOY almost exactly at the 1,380 ft altitude restriction, but at approximately 1,500 Ft/min, or twice the nominal value. Did this vertical rate create a non-normal tempo for the approach after the 1,000 ft (above touchdown) call and contribute to the crew's failure to anticipate reaching minimums?