Having read the report, it is clear that 76 KGS was remaining in the main tank and both supply tanks were effectively empty.
This situation is entirely commensurate with the finding that both transfer pumps were switched off.
The LOW FUEL warnings generated by the thermistors in the supply tanks and recorded by the VMS also support the first two findings.
Safety needs to be assured and it is clear to me that this helicopter fuel system was not operated correctly to the point that the systems gave more than adequate warning of impending doom. In addition the pilot operated below the published MLA and, at face value, appears unaware that his airmanship would have led him to carefully manage his fuel, based on his airborne time, if he had a full and complete understanding of his fuel system.
The EC135 has a long and faithful service record in HEMS and Police roles. I see nothing in the AAIB report that in any way tarnishes that record.
Flight Safety principles demand that we accept the most probable causes unearthed during AAIB investigations. Flailing around tryin to grasp at straws in an effort to avoid the bleeding obvious serves no man. It is misleading, unhelpful and deflects the necessary attention that all emergency service pilots should pay to their fuel management towards the end of a long task.
I did not know this pilot but I do know that none of us are immune from such circumstances that he found himself in that night.
The remaining fuel never made it to the engines cos the pumps needed to make it happen we're selected OFF. The pilot had a few more chances to get it right and switch them back on again as the warning lights began to illuminate. Finally a chance to survive if the correct response to double OEI is deployed. SID I know this is deeply unpalatable to you but I think you should breath out and face the facts and findings detailed in the AAIB report and see them for what they actually represent.