tubby, you are mistaken.
4 No mention is made of the box on the chart stating that this procedure is not authorised at night.
Please accept the correction that was offered to you.
Originally Posted by GlobalNav
4. The NA was mentioned during the hearing - but actually there is a NOTAM making the approach available at night - Jepp chart otwithstanding - so it was a legal approach.
This was discussed in some detail in the initial Tech Log thread, which I seem to recall your participating in. The approach plate clearly states a condition for the NA: VGSI inop. This too was discussed in the other thread.
My memory is hazy: I can't recall if the company had not authorized that approach "as is" but required a VNAV or other nav system.
Were you referring to the company rules/SOP not allowing that approach at night?
That's not the same issue as the NA on a plate.
5 The thousand feel calls seems to occur at 1000ft amsl( only 360ft above ground)
^^^This, and your point on both descent rates, and glide slope, strike me as key areas of interest. The crew (CVR transcript is the ref) seems to recognize that they are getting a late descent/are high as they get into the approach.
And this:
Capt. Beal violated UPS rules by abruptly switching to a different type of approach and then commanding the autopilot to maintain an excessively steep descent. UPS officials testified that both of those events should have prompted pilots to initiate a go-around, or immediate climb away from the airport. Instead, the crew continued the approach below the safe altitude for making such a decision.
As to this:
In one email released by the board, an FAA official indicated three months after the crash that the visual navigation aids installed on the Birmingham runway weren't designed to handle planes as large as the Airbus A300.
Can someone explain to me what is meant by that?