From the original thread that has somehow ended up over on Tech Log:
The captain tried to upgrade from first officer twice unsuccessfully in 2002 before finally making it on the third try in 2009. He also somehow failed homestudy training three times in 1991 and 1992 and failed recurrent FO sim training in 2007. He failed his CFI ride in 1985. This would be unusual for most of the pilot group in my experience.
http://www.pprune.org/tech-log/52137...ml#post8330120
See:
http://dms.ntsb.gov/public%2F55000-5...7%2F550065.pdf
Mention of crew training issues was conspicuously absent from the NTSB hearing. Also, the captain's military background as an aviator would normally be documented in an NTSB docket in my experience.
It could be argued that lower standards are accepted for night freight operations, indeed the accident crew makes this assertion concerning rest rules on the CVR.
Also, I would observe that industry training standards were lowered in the 1990's, sometimes inconsistently and egregiously, to embrace a broader demographic in the wake of the landmark United Airlines EEOC settlement.
Written tests were dumbed down or abolished and systems knowledge was de-emphasized to reach out to those with less technical background and ability. Interview sim rides were switched to general aviation trainers (e.g. the Frasca at United) so that people with experience flying large planes would not have an undue advantage in the hiring process.
It has been observed that we are very quick to comment here on cultural and training issues here when an Asian crew flies a perfectly good aircraft into the ground. However, when a U.S. crew does it we tiptoe around our own cultural taboos in my view.
Would better training standards help prevent accidents like the BHM crash? Should multiple training failures be discussed along with fatigue and other human factors issues when analyzing causes of the mishap?
I wonder if these questions will be addressed in the final NTSB report.